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Legal Certainty: A European Alternative to
American Legal Indeterminacy?
James R. Maxeiner'
Americans are resigned to a high level of legal indetenninacy. This Article shows that
Europeans do not accept legal indetenninacy and instead have made legal certainty a general
principle of their law. This Article uses the example of the German legal system to show how
Gennan legal methods strive to realize this general European principle. It suggests that these
methods are opportunities for Americans to develop their Ow.11 system to reduce legal
indeterminacy and to increase legal certainty.
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Americans-at least American lawyers-are resigned to a high
level of legal indetenninacy. Legal indetenninacy means that the law
does not always detennine the answer to a legal question. According to
the strongest version of the "indetenninacy thesis;' known as "radical
indetenninacy," law is always indefInite and never certain, any decision is
legally justifIable in any case, and law is nothing more than politics by
another name. I While few American lawyers subscribe to radical
indetenninacy, most probably agree with Professors Jules Coleman and
Brian Leiter that "[o]n1y ordinary citizens, some jurisprudes, and firstyear law students have a working conception of law as detenninate.'>2
The aphorism "we are all realists now" reveals legal indetenninacy as the
working conception of American lawyers generally.3 Professor Michael
C. Dorf poignantly points out the disturbing result: "[i]f the application
of a rule requires deliberation about its meaning, then the rule cannot be
a guide to action in the way that a commitment to the rule of law appears
to require.""
Legal indetenninacymay govern Americans, but it is not acceptable
to Europeans. Legal certainty-not legal indetenninacy-is a guiding
principle of European legal systems. It "requires that all law [must] be
sufficiently precise to allow the person-if need be, with appropriate
advice-to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances,
the consequences which a given action may entail."s

1.
For two articles summarizing and challenging the ''radical indeterminacy" argument,
see Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 283 (1989); Lawrence B. Solum, On the
Indetenninacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 462 (1987). Sec also
Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION 10 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
488 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
'
2.
Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy- Objectivit,y, andAuthority, 142 U. PA.
L. REv. 549, 579 n.54 (1993); cf. Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REv. I, 7
(1983); Gordon A. Christenson, Uncertainty in Law and Its Negation: Reflections, 54 U. CIN. L
REv. 347, 349 (1985).
3.
Stephen A. Smith, Taking Law Scrious/y, 50 U. TORONIDLJ. 241,247 (2000) ("[A]n
unstated working assumption of most legal academics is that judicial explanations of a judgment
tell us little if anything about why a case was decided as it was."); sec also Paul D. Carrington,
Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive Independence of the
Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REv. 397, 399-400 (1999) (noting much the same for the public at
large).
4.
Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indetcnninacy and Institutional Design, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv.
875, 877 (2003); sec also Coleman & Leiter, supra note 2, at 582; Richard A. Epstein, Some
Doubts on Constitutionallndetenninacy, 19 HARv. IL. & PuB. POCy 363, 363 (1996).
5.
Korchuganova v. Russia, No. 75039/01, Judgment, '1147 (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 8, 2006),
hUp:J/www.echr.coe.intlECHRIENIHeader/Case-LawIHUDOClHUDOC+databasei (search "HUDOC"
for "Application Number 75039/01; then follow hyperlink to download).
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The term legal certainty is not unknown in America. But more
than seventy-five years ago it was ridiculed and now is no longer used in
serious discourse about law.7 In the United States, legal certainty is seen
to be an infantile longing. It is a childhood myth that one gets over, just
8
as one gets over one's belief in Santa Claus or in the Wizard of OZ.
Americans who know only their own legal system may assume that that
is just the way legal systems are. Americans do not engage in serious
scholarly study oflegal certainty as Europeans do. 9
In an earlier article, I contended that the high level of legal
indeterminacy in America is a product of specific American choices of
legal methods.1O It is wrong, I wrote, to generalize from American
experiences and to assume that high levels of legal indeterminacy are
inevitable. I I Other systems can, and do, perform better. Examining how
those systems implement their law might suggest ways to reduce legal
indeterminacy in our law. This is the beginning of such an examination. 12

6.
Already in 1820 Justice Story used the term. Joseph Story, On Chancery Jurisdiction,
II N. AM. REv. 140, 157 (1820). To be sure, more frequently the term appears in the descriptive
sense of certainty of proof.
7.
Jerome Frank is the person most generally credited with its demise. JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND TIlE MODERN MIND 5-6 (6th prtg. Jan. 1949). Sec generally Julius Paul, Jerome Frank's
Attack on the "Myth" of Legal Certainty, 36 NEB. L. REv. 547 (1957). But already Holmes
identified in the logical method of law a "longing for certainty" that is "illusory." O.w. Holmes,
Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., The Path of the Law, Address at the Boston University School
of Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARv. L. REv. 457,466 (1897) [hereinafter Holmes, The Path of the
Law]; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARY. L. REv. I, 7
(1894) [hereinafter Holmes, Privilege].
8.
E.g., Craig M. Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE
L.J. 1,63.
9.
One can hardly imagine holding a conference on legal certainty in the United States
such as was recently held in Great Britain. See Soc'y of Legal Scholars, Legal Certainty
Conference 15116 September 2006, http://www.legalscholars.ac.ukltextlpaper.cfin?n0=49 (last
visited Jan. 11, 2007). Equally difficult to imagine are up-and-coming young scholars basing
their academic prospects on writing 350+ page "tenure" books on legal certainty. See, e.g.,
ANDREAS VON ARNAULD, RECHTSSICHERHEIT: PERSPEKTIVISCHE ANNAHERUNGEN AN EINE IDEE
DIRECTRICE DES REcHTS (2006); Patricia Popelier, Legal Certainty and Principles ofProper Law
Making, 2 EUR. IL. REFORM 321, 321 (2000) (summarizing PATRICIA POPELIER,
RECHTSZEKERHEID ALS BEGINSEL VAN BEHOORLUKE REGELGEVING (1997»; JUHA RAmo, THE
PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL CERTAINTY IN EC LAW (2003).
10. James R. Maxeiner, Legal Indetenninacy Made in Amen"ca: Us. Legal Methods and
theRuJeofLaw, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 517, 517-18, 520 (2006).
11. Id at 520.
12. In other words, I am following here two of the most basic and traditional grounds for
comparative law: perspective on one's own system and ideas for its improvement. See HERMANN
VON MANOOLDT, GESCHRlEBENE VERFASSUNG UNO REcHTSSICHERHEIT IN DEN VEREINIGTEN
STAATEN VON AMERIKA, at v (1934) (study of legal certainty in America at the beginning of the
Nazi dictatorship by a liberal professor who later was involved in drafting the postwar German
constitution and author of what is still one of the leading commentaries on that constitution).
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Part I of this Article shows that most or all major European legal
systems have the principle of legal certainty. Europeans do not accept
legal indeteI111inacy as a working assumption. Part II examines how that
general principle serves as a guide for the implementation of law in one
EU Member State, the Federal Republic of Germany. Finally, Part ill
makes comparative observations between legal indeterminacy in the
United States and legal certainty in Europe and Germany. At the outset,
it is helpful to clarify what this Article does not do: it does not contend
that any legal system in Europe has achieved absolute certainty. It does
not argue that such an achievement is either possible or desirable. It does
not claim that the American legal system can or should adopt any of the
specific methods used in European systems to enhance legal certainty.
Its more modest goal is to dispel American resignation that present levels
of indeterminacy in American law are inevitable and insurmountabl~.

I.

LEGAL CERTAINTY IN EUROPE

A.

Legal Certainty and the FOI111al Rule ofLaw

Legal certainty is a "general principle" of the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and a guiding idea of many, if not all, of
the legal systems of the European Union's Member States. 13 It is
similarly a general principle of the jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR), whose jurisdiction includes not only all EU
Member States, but almost all other states in Europe. 14 The principle of
legal certainty as discussed in Europe (and elsewhere lS) is closely related

13. The Member States of the European Union are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus,
the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Gennany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. European Union: Delegation of
the Eur. Comm'n to the U.S., The Member States, http://www.eurunion.orglstatesloffices.htm
(last visited Jan. 20, 2007).
14. For an example of the ECHR applying the principle oflegal certainty to the internal
proceedings of a non-EU state, see Neofitta v. Russia, No. 3311/06, Judgment (Eur. Ct. H.R. Apr.
12, 2007), http://www.thegovemmentsays.comlcache/170977.html. In addition to the twentyseven Member States of the European Union, the Council of Europe has nineteen other Member
States: Albania, Andorra, Annenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Georgia,
Iceland, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Moldova, Monaco, Norway, the Russian Federation, San
Marino, Serbia, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine. Belarus and Montenegro are candidates for
membership. Canada, the Holy See, Japan, Mexico, and the United States have observer status.
Council of Eur., The Council of Europe's Member States, http://www.coe.intIT/elcomlabouc
coe!member_statesldefault.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2007).
15. For example, the principle of legal certainty is used in Australia and Japan. See JOHN
OwEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 93 (1998); Ke\linde Turcotte, Why Legal Flexibl7ity Is
Not a Threat to Either the Common Law System of England and Australia or the Civil Law
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to the principles of law discussed in the United States as the fonnal rule
of law. 16 The fonnal rule of law is distinguished from what is called the
substantive rule of law. While the latter includes social, political, or
economic goals, and thus can be quite controversial, the fonner consists
purely of legal principles that direct and limit the making and application
of substantive law generally and is subject to greater consensus as to
meaning. 17 The essential elements of the fonnal rule of law are: 18 laws
should be validly made and publicly promulgated, of general application,
stable, clear in meaning, consistent, and prospective. 19 In this sense it
imposes requirements on the application of law including: 20 law
application should be impartial; provide parties who are sanctioned an
opportunity to be heard; and deliver predictable, consistent decisions in
individual cases.21
These requirements help law fulfill an ordering role. They make
voluntary compliance with law possible. They mean that law can guide
those subject to it. They protect persons subject to the law from the
arbitrary use of the power to make and apply law. When the rule of law
is safeguarded, when legal certainty is accorded, subjects can rely on the
law and can foresee application of state power. They secure and
safeguard personal autonomy.22

System of France in the Twenty-first Century, 1 HANSE L. REv. 190, 191 (2005), available at
http://www.hanselawreview.org.
16. Laszlo Solyom, Introduction to the Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the
Republic ofHungary, in LAsZL6 SOLYOM & GEORG BRUNNER, CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIARY IN A
NEW DEMOCRACY: THE HUNGARIAN CONSTI1Vl10NAL COURT I, 6 (2000) ("[W)hen the
establishment of the fonnal rule of law over politics was the greatest order of the day, this
principle was practically equated with the principle of legal certainty."); sec also Popelier, supra
note 9, at 325-27; RAITIo, supra note 9, at 127.
17. On fonnal theories of the rule of law generally, see BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE
RuLE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 91-101 (2004). On substantive theories of the rule of
law generally, see id at 102-13.
18. See, e.g., D. Neil MacCormick, Der Rechtsstaat und die role of law,
JuruSTENZEITUNG 65, 67 (1984); Randall Peerenboom, A Govemment of Laws: Democracy,
Rule ofLaw andAdministrative Law Refonn in the PRe, 12 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 45, 51 (2003).
19. These requirements are found in: LoN L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-94 (rev.
ed. 1969); NEIL MACCORMlCK, QUESTIONING SOVEREIGNTY 45 (1999); David Kairys, Searching
for the Rule ofLaw, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 307, 318 (2003) (referring to a "minimalist" rule of
law); MacCormick, supra note 18, at 68; Peerenboom, supra note 18, at 51 (contrasting a "thick"
rule of law with a "thin" one); Robert S. Summers, The Principles ofthe Rule ofLaw, 74 NOTRE
DAMEL.REv.1691,1693-95(1999).
20. FULLER, supra note 19, at 81-91 (referring to "congruence").
21. Here no attempt is made at a comprehensive inventory of the requirements of a
formal rule oflaw. For such an inventory, see Summers, supra note 19, at 1693-95.
22. Sec Otto Rudolf Kissel, Gedanken zur Rechtssicherhcit, in RoMAN HERZOG ET AL.,
GESETZ UND RICHTERSPRUCH IN DER VERFASSUNGSORDNUNG DER BUNDESREPUBLIK

2007]

LEGAL CERTAINTY

547

Protection of the rule of law in this formal sense, however, only
assures the integrity and the regularity of the application of legal rules as
such; it does not assure that rules serve either justice or the general
welfare. A state might be governed by the rule of law, yet not be
democratic;23 it might be unjust, ineffective, or morally bankrupt,24
Demands for clarity, consistency, and predictability conflict with the
ability to generalize in rules. There is, as the German legal philosopher
Gustav Radbruch explained, an antimony among justice, public policy,
and legal certainty. "Legal certainty demands positivity, yet positive law
claims to be valid without regard to its justice or expediency [i.e., public
policy or purposiveness].,,25 But Radbruch did not see in legal certainty
an absolute value. Instead, he observed that it "takes a curious middle
place between the other two values ... because it is required not only for
the public benefit but also for justice."26 These conflicts have long been
recognized by American common lawyers as well;27 they were at the
heart of nineteenth century codification controversy.28 They are not
resolvable. Every legal system must balance these three competing
components. Complete legal certainty is neither possible nor desirable.
B.

General Principles ofEuropean Union Law

Legal certainty is a general principle ofEU law.29 It is one of only a
handful of such principles that the ECJ has so recognized. Among the
most important, other such principles are: (1) proportionality, (2) equal
treatment and nondiscrimination, (3) protection of fundamental rights,

DEUTSCHLAND 15, 17 (1990); Peerenboom, supra note 18, at 53; Summers, supra note 19, at
1704-05.
23. See, e.g., WOLFGANGFIKENTSCHER,DEMOKRATIE: EINEEINFUHRUNG 51 (1993).
24. See Summers, supra note 19, at 1707.
25. Gustav Radbruch, Legal Philosophy, in4 20rn CENTURY LEGAL PHILOSOPHY SERIES:
THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES OF LASK, RADBRUCH, AND DABIN pt. II, § 9, at 109 (Kurt Wilk trans.,
1950). For extended discussions of this antimony, with emphasis on the tension between justice
and legal certainty, see VON ARNAULD, supra note 9, ch. 8.
26. See Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Ul1IfXht und iibergesetzliches Recht, in
SODDEUTSCHE JURISTENZEITUNG 105 (1946), reprinted in GUSTAV RADBRUCH,
RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE 339, 345 (8th ed. 1973) (translated as Gustav Radbruch, Statutory
Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law (1946), 26 OxFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (Bonnie
Litschewski Paulson & Stanley 1... Paulson trans., 2006) [hereinafter Radbruch, Statutory
Lawlessness1)·
27. See, e.g., Holmes, Privilege, supra note 7, at 7; Story, supm note·6, at 156.
28. See Maxeiner, supm note 10, at 530-31.
29. LEONARD JASON-LLOYD & SVKHWINDER BAJWA, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 5 (1997).
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and (4) right to hearing and defense. 30 The EeJ gives the principle of
legal certainty considerable importance in its case law and has referred to
legal certainty in many hundreds of decisions. 31
European jurists distinguish the general principles from specific
rules much in the same way that common-law jurists following Professor
Ronald Dworkin distinguish principles from rules. General principles,
unlike specific rules, do not usually require one specific answer, but
instead provide a direction and a justification for answers. 32 General
principles set out fundamental propositions of law that support specific
legal norms. 33
The EeJ derives general principles from two sources: the rule of
law as understood in the EU Member States and the "essential
characteristics" of the European Union's legal order itself.34 French and
German understandings of the rule of law, in particular the German ideal
of the rule-of-Iaw state (Rechtsstaat), have been particularly influential in
the development of the general principles.3s The English understanding
of the rule of law has had less importance.36 This is explained in part by
the peculiar orientation of English rule-of-Iaw thinking and in part by
history:31 the EeJ operated for more than twenty years before the United
Kingdom and other countries joined France, Germany, Italy, and the
Benelux countries in the common market.
While the EeJ looks to the laws of the Member States to fmd
general principles, it does not limit itself to principles already accepted in
every Member State. It can, and does, recognize principles that vary in
whether and how they are found in the laws of the Member States.38

30. ANnIONY ARNULL, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EEC LAW AND THE INDIVIDUAL 3-5
(1990) (not discussing fundamental rights); JASON-LLOYD & BAJWA, supra note 29, at 5-7; TAKIS
TRID1MAS, THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EU LAW 6 (2d ed. 2006); JOHN A. USHER, GENERAL
PRiNCIPLES OF EC LAW 1-9 (1998) (discussing the development of general principles). As the
cited references make clear, the exact delineation and enumeration of the principles is not
unifonn. The general principles "underlie all areas of [ED] activity, and show very clearly the
extent to which there is mutual influence between [ED] law and the national legal systems of the
Member States." USHER, supra, at ix.
31. Sec USHER, supra note 30, at 52, 65.
32. TRlDlMAS, supra note 30, at 1-2; see RAlno, supra note 9, at 267-304; John
Braithwaite, Rules and Principles: A Theory ofLegal Certainty, 27 AUSTRALIAN J. LEGAL PHIL.
47,50 (2002).
33. SecTRlDIMAS, supra note 30, at 1.
34. Idat4.
35. Sec id at 23-25; Popelier, supra note 9, at 325-26.
36. SecTRlDlMAS, supra note 30, at 25.
37. Id
38. Id at 5-6.
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The ECJ places the general principles on the same plane as the
constitutional treaties of the European Union itself. It has relied on
general principles since its earliest days in the 1950s. At first, it used the
principles chiefly as aids to interpretation and for gap-filling in the new
European legal order. Soon, however, it began relying on the general
principles as grounds for review of EU action and for damages against
the European Union. Beginning in the 1980s, the ECJ began to hold that
the principles apply not only to EU laws and institutions, but also to the
laws and institutions of the Member States. Because the general
principles apply Union-wide, they modify law in the Member States and
promote harmonization. In this way, the general principles have found
acceptance, even in legal systems that did not originally include them. 39
The influence of the general principles is growing not only within
but also outside of the European Union. The EClIR, which is not subject
to the ECJ, now applies them as part of its own jurisprudence.40 Its
jurisdiction extends beyond the European Union to all members of the
Council of Europe, and thus to countries such as Russia and Turkey.
C

Legal Certainty as a General Principle ofEuropean Law

Legal certainty as a general principle of European law requires,
above all, that those subject to the law must know what the law is so that
they can abide by it and plan their lives accordingly.41 It requires that:
(I) laws and decisions must be made public; (2) laws and decisions must
be definite and clear; (3) decisions of courts must be binding;
(4) limitations on retroactivity of laws and decisions must be imposed;
and (5) legitimate expectations must be protected.42 Court decisions
limiting retroactivity and the protection of legitimate expectations have

39. This paragraph is based on chapter 1 ofTRlDlMAS, supra note 30. Along with the
ECJ, other EU institutions promote application of the general principles, including legal certainty.
See, e.g., P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, European Ombudsman, The European Ombudsman
Speech: Respect for Fundamental and Human Rights by the European Administration:
Standards and Remedies (June 6, 2005), available at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eulspeechesl
en/2005-06-06.htm.
40. See VON ARNAULD, supra note 9, ch. 7.m (noting that the ECHR did not always
incorporate the general principles). Recent cases frequently refer to general principles, such as
legal certainty. For the rule of general principles in the ECHR's jurisprudence, see Michele de
Salvia, La place de la notion de st5curit6 juridique dans la jurisprudence de la Cour europ6enne
des droils de l'llomme, 11 LES CAHIERS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL 93, 94 (2001).
41. TRlDIMAS, supra note 30, at 242.
42. See VON ARNAULD, supra note 9, ch. 7.II (giving numerous citations to decisions of
the ECl).
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been particularly cornmon.43 In the development of the EU general
principle of legal certainty, the corresponding German concept of legal
certainty (Rechtssicherheil) has so overshadowed the influence of
concepts from other systems that Germans ask if legal certainty is a
German "phenomenon" and the French wonder if legal certainty, even in
their own country, might be an import.44
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the development and
details of the general principle of legal certainty in EU law. Detailed
4s
descriptions of the general principle itself are available elsewhere. The
purpose of this Article is to demonstrate that American resignation to the
inevitability of legal indeterminacy is misplaced and that alternatives
exist. To do that, it is important to show the general principle of legal
certainty in operation.
While one could examine the implementation of the general
principle of legal certainty in the European Union's legal system, that
system is still very much in development. Further, directly binding EU
law accounts for only a small percentage of all EU law and a still smaller
percentage of all law in Europe. Most EU law takes the form of
"directives," i.e., framework laws, that instruct Member States how to
create their own laws. Directives are binding as to the results to be
achieved, but leave to each Member State "the choice of form and
methods.'>46 Form and methods are still largely national forms and
methods. Thus, when it comes to implementation of law, the European
Union still consists of twenty-seven legal systems. Consequently,
comparative study of the implementation of legal certainty in the
European Union should address legal certainty in specific Member
States.
Legal certainty is an established principle in all of the founding
Member States of the European Union, i.e., the Benelux countries,47
43. SeeTRlDIMAS, supmnote 30, at 252-97; USHER, supmnote 30, at 52-71. So much so
in the case of protecting legitimate expectations that it is sometimes considered a principle apart
from the principle oflegal certainty.
44. VON ARNAULD, supra note 9, ch. 7.1. But see USHER, supm note 30, at 65 ("This is a
principle so general that it cannot really be ascribed to any particular national source.").
45. See, e.g., VON ARNAULD, sl¥7mnote 9, ch. 7.ll; RAlTIO, sl¥7mnote 9.
46. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 249,
Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 OJ. (C 325) 132 [hereinafter EC TreatyJ. See generally MARTIN GEBAUER &
THOMAS WIEDMANN, ZMLRECHT UNTER EUROPAISCHEM EINFLuss, DIE RlCHTLINIENKONFORME
AUSLEGUNG DES BGB UNO ANDERER GESETZE-ERI..AUTERUNG DER WICHTIGSTEN EGVERORDNUNGEN 97 (2005); SACHA PRECHAL, DIRECTIVES IN EC LAW (2d ed. 2005).
47. Legal certainty is known as rcchtszekerheid in the Benelux countries. See POPELIER,
supm note 9, at 107; M.E. STORME ET AL., VERTROUWENSBEGINSEL EN RECHTSZEKERHEID IN
BELGffi (1997); J.B.M. VRANKEN ET AL., VERTROUWENSBEGINSEL EN RECHTSZEKERHEID IN
NEDERLAND (1997); Popelier, supmnote 9, at 321.
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France,48 Germany/9 and ltaly;SO in all of the larger accession states, i.e.,
United Kingdom,sl Spain,s2 Poland;s3 and probably in most or all of the
smaller accession states,'4 i.e., Denmark, Sweden,'s Finland,S6 Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania,s7 the Czech Republic,s8 Slovakia, Austria, Hungary,'9
Slovenia, Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Portugal, Ireland, Romania, and
Bulgaria. It is recognized increasingly in Council of Europe states that
are not members of the European Union.60 Most states recognize the
principle through court decisions and academic commentaries, but Spain
explicitly guarantees legal certainty in its constitution.61
D.

Implementing Legal Certainty Through Legal Methods

Recognizing a principle, of course, does not mean realizing it. This
Article is concerned with what Jan Michiel Otto has nicely called "real
legal certainty," i.e., whether the general principle of legal certainty
actually contributes to its realization.62
48. Legal certainty is known as securite juridique in France. See VON ARNAULD, supra
note 9, ch. 7.Iv.1.
49. Legal certainty is known as Rechtssicherheit in Gennany. See Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Apr. 30, 2003, 107 EntscheidWlgen des
BundesverfassWlgsgerichts [BVerfGE] 395 (416) (F.R.G.); infia Part II.
50. Legal certainty is known as certezza del diritto in Italy. See VON ARNAULD, supra note
9, ch. 7.IY.3; STEFANO BERTEA, CERTEZZA DEL DIRITIO E ARGOMENTAZIONE GlURJDICA (2002);
FLAVIO LoPEZ DE Oi'iATE, LA CERTEZZA DEL DlRITIO (1968).
51. SeeSoc'y Legal Scholars, supra note 9.
52. Legal certainty is known as la seguridadjuridica in Spain. See VON ARNAULD, supra
note 9, ch. 7.Iv.2.
53. Legal certainty is known as do obowiqzujqcego prawa in Poland. See VON ARNAULD,
supra note 9, ch. 7.Iv.5.
54. I say probably because I have not researched the laws of these Member States, except
as specifically noted.
55. Legal certainty is known as riittssiikerhetin Sweden. SeeRAmo, supra note 9, at 127
(citing ALEKSANDER PEcZENlK, VAD AR RATI1 OM DEMOKRATl, RATTSSAKERHET, ETIK OCH
JURIDISKARGUMENTATlON (1995».
56. Legal certainty is known as oikeusvarmuuden pcriaate in Finland. See RAITlO, supra
note 9, at 126.
57. See Tadas Klimas & Jurate Vaiciukaite, Incorporation of Intemational Agreements
into the Law ofLithuania, 4 FLA. COASTAL LJ. 195, 201 n.l2 (2003) (referring to VALENTINAS
MIKELENAS ET AL., LIETUVOS RESPUBLIKOS CIVILINIO KoDEKSO: KoMENTARAS (2001 ».
58. See Slovak Restitution Decision, ~j. 215/1994, Judgment (Ustavni soud Ceske
republiky (US) (Constitutional Court) June 8, 1995) (Czech Rep.), http://test.concourt.czlangl_
verze/doc/4-215-94.html.
59. SeeS61yom,supranote 16,at38-39.
60. See generaJ.(yCoWlcil of Eur., Venice Comm'n, Presentation, http://www.venice.coe.
intlsite!mainlpresentation_E.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2007).
61. Constituci6n [C.E.] art. 9, para. 3 (Spain).
62. Jan Michiel Otto, Toward an Analytical Framework: Real Legal Certainty and Its
Explanatory Factors, in IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REpUBLIC OF CHINA 23, 25
(Jianfu Chen et aI. eds., 2002). Otto dermes real Jegal certainty as

552

TULANE J. OF INT'L &- COMP. LA W

[Vol. 15:541

As I suggested in my earlier article on legal indeterminacy, one way
to determine whether a legal system delivers on its rule-of-Iaw promises
is to consider how it implements those requirements throughout its legal
methods. More important than occasional appellate decisions is the
everyday situation, and not just the everyday in the courthouse.63 How
well does law guide those subject to it?
Legal methods are the principal means by which law content is
made clear and by which law application is made predictable.64 Broadly
speaking, legal methods are those devices used to apply abstract legal
rules to factual situations in order to decide concrete cases. 65 Legal
methods as the means to decide concrete cases include, in a broad sense,
creating as well as implementing legal rules. 66 This Article considers
these methods under three rubrics: law making, law finding, and law
applying.67 It also considers conflicts and coordination among rules
within one jurisdiction.
It is beyond the scope of this Article and would exceed the
competence of this author to examine the legal methods in all twentyseven Member States. Instead, this Article considers legal certainty and
legal methods in only one Member State, Germany. Consideration of
other Member States in the future is desirable.

the chances that in a given situation:
there are clear, consistent and accessible legal rules, issued or acknowledged by or
on behalf of the state;
the government institutions apply these rules consistently and themselves comply
with them;
most citizens in principle conform to such rules;
in the course of dispute settlement, independent and impartial judges apply such
rules consistently; and
their judicial decisions are actually put into practice.
ld

63. SeeMaxeiner, supra note 10, at 526; sec a/so Summers, supra note 19, at 1691 n.2.
64. Discussions of legal methods qua legal methods often focus on handling precedents
and construing statutes. See, e.g., Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Statutory Interprotation in the
Federal Republic of Gel111any, in INTERPRETING STA11JTES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 73 (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1991); INTERPRETING PREcEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997).
65. See I WOLFGANG FlKENTSCHER, METHODEN DES REcIITS IN VERGLEICHENDER
DARSTELLUNG 13-15 (1975).
66. Cf. JAN ScHAPp, HAUPTPROBLEME DER JURISTISCHEN METHODENLEHRE (1983).
Schapp relates statute, case, and judicial decision. Starting from the "case:' he then proceeds to
look at the legislative decision of the case, the judicial decision of the case, the teaching of
statutory construction, and legal doctrine. ld
67. Sec Maxeiner, supra note 10.
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There are sound reasons to choose Germany for the first
examination. Gennany by population is the largest of the EU Member
States. It is also an original Member State. Of all legal systems in
Europe, its legal system has had the greatest influence on development of
the EU general principle of legal certainty.68 Finally, Germany is a
particularly good choice for reference to the American system, because
both Germany and the United States are federal states.
II.

LEGAL CERTAINTY IN GERMANY

A.

Legal Certainty as a Guiding Idea ofGerman Legal Methods

The subtitle of Professor Andreas von Arnauld's recent book
analyzing legal certainty in German and European law reveals his thesis:
legal certainty is an "idee-directricr!' or "Leitgedanke," that is, a guiding
idea or leitmotiv, to be found in every modem legal system.69 The extent
and the manner in which it is incorporated into positive law varies from
legal system to legal system, but its realization is essential to the
realization of individual autonomy.70
Professor von Arnauld shows that legal certainty71 is a principle of
constitutional rank in Germany.72 He shows that legal certainty
permeates German law, even though, by itself, it is discussed surprisingly
little.73 Legal certainty's importance derives less from providing an
independent basis for reviewing a decision (its sub-principles provide
that basis) and more from being an omnipresent guiding idea protecting
personal autonomy. Long before individual decisions are reached, legal
certainty is a consideration in how those decisions will be made.

68. TRIDIMAS, supra note 30, at 23-25.
69. VON ARNAULD, supra note 9, ch. 9.I-11. Maurice Hauriou used the concept of ideedirectrice in Maurice Hauriou, Theory ofthe Institution and the Foundation: A Study in Social
Vita/ism, in 8 20TH CENTIJRY LEGAL PHILosoPHY SERIES: THE FRENCH INSTITIJTIONALISTS 93
(Albert Broderick ed., Mary Welling trans., 1970) (fIrst published in French in 1925). According
to Hauriou, the directing idea of an institution is not to be confused with its end or with its
function: the directing idea is interior to the institution while end and function are exterior. Id at
101.
70. VON ARNAULD, supra note 9, ch. 9.1I, VI.
71. The Gennan term for legal certainty is "Rechtssicherheit:' That term is routinely
translated as legal certainty, but more than does its English translation, the German term
..Sicherheil' suggests security or reliability as well as certainty. This brings it still closer in
meaning to the formal rule of law discussed in the United States. The Gennan term includes both
certainty of "orientation" and of "realization:' Sec JAMES MAXEINER, POLICY AND METHODS IN
GERMAN AND AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 10-14 (1986).
72. VON ARNAULD, supra note 9, ch. 9.11-I1I.l (discussing also the debate as to its
particular source).
73. Secid
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German legal methods implement that guiding idea. Nearly a
century ago, Ludwig Bendix noted the close connection between legal
certainty and legal methods: "[t]he concept of legal certainty is a central
concept of [our] inherited legal methods, in which all have grown up....
It is the air in which all jurists have learned to breathe."74
The prevailing German view of legal methods is that norms, i.e.,
rules, are applied syllogistically to the case at hand. 7s The factual case is
subsumed under the applicable law. The goal of legal process is a legally
justified decision. 76 This act of subsumption (in German, Subsumtion) is
intended to produce a decision according to the law. Its logical method
responds to the desire for certainty. 77
For generations, legal methods have been a topic of scholarly
interest in Germany. The deficiencies of subsumption as a description of
what all judges do all the time are well recognized. Professor Roman
Herzog, who served both as President of the Federal Constitutional Court
and as President of Germany, pointed out the problem:
The popular perception is that the legislature issues or rather "gives"
general and abstract rules, to which the judge in deciding the individual
case referred to him is not only bound, but which are so clear, unmistakable
and complete, that he needs only apply or "carry them out" without any
individual creativity. In a metaphor repeated thousands of times,
Montesquieu opined that the judge is only the "mouthpiece of the statute"
. . .. I will not further address here, what could have led a man so
experienced in practice to such fundamental mistakes....
The accuracy of [my] thesis is apparent to anyone who has ever only
78
once interpreted a legal nonnand applied it to a concrete case.
74. LUDWIG BENDIX, DAS PRoBLEM DER REcHTSSICHERHEIT: ZUR EINFOHRUNG DES
RELATIVISMUS IN DIE REcHTSANWENDUNGSLEHRE 2 (1914) (author's translation) ("Der Begriff der
Rechtssicherheit ist der Zentralbegriff der iiberlieferten Methode, in der aile die groB geworden
sind, die diese Methode jetzt bekiimpfen, er ist gleichsam die Luft, in der aIle Juristen atmen
gelemt haben.").
75. Sed FIKENTSCHER, supra note 65, at 638 (1976).
76. OSKAR HARTWIEG & HANS ALBRECHT HESSE, DIE ENTSCHEIDUNG 1M ZIVILPROZEB:
EIN STUDIENBUCH OBER METHODE, REcHTSGEFOHL UNO RoUTINE IN GUTACHTEN UND URTEIL 59
(1981) ("Das Ziel richterlicher Arbeit ist die rechtlich begriindete Entscheidung.").
77. Cf Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 7, at 466 ("And the logical method and
form flatter that longing for certainty and for repose which is in every human mind. But certainty
generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical form lies a
judgment as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an
inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole
proceeding. You can give any conclusion a logical form.").
78. Roman Herzog, Gesetzgeber und Richter-Zwei LegaJitiitsquellen?, in GESETZ UNO
RICHTERSPRUCH IN DER VERFASSUNGSORDNUNG DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 5, 5-6
(1990) (author's translation) ("Die landliiufige VorsteJIung geht meist dahin, daB der Gesetzgeber
genereJIe und abstrakte RegeJn erliillt bzw. ,gibt', an die der Richter bei der Entscheidung des fum
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The ideal of perfect legal certainty is mistaken, Professor Herzog
explained, because it presupposes three conditions that legislators can
never meet: (1) they must foresee and judge all possible cases; (2) they
must be able to classify abstractly all such cases so that none is
overlooked; and (3) they must use a language so precise that it permits
bringing all the cases identified in (2) within the judgment of (1 ).79
Knowledge of the deficiencies of sUbsumption has not led to its
abandonment. While numerous alternatives have been considered, it is
firmly entrenched as the method actually used. Improving that method,
rather than denying its existence, is the practical direction of modem
German law. Improvement means clearer rules, when possible, and
conscious delegation of value-oriented decisions, when not possible.
When a value-oriented decision must be delegated, there should be
clarity as to whether the decision is to be based on equity or on policy.80
Subsumption is recognized not to be simple and not to explain all cases.
Yet it remains the way that the vast majority of all cases are decided. As
the late Professor Arthur Kaufinann observed, adherents of subsumption
1
are like smokers: they still do it, but it is no longer as pleasane
The German structure of legal metho<is--systematic norms applied
syllogistically-promotes legal certainty. It does not, cannot, and should
not achieve complete legal certainty. But it serves the guidance function
of the rule of law by paying attention to the needs of the subjects of the
law, who, through their self-application of the law, account for 99.99% or
more of all applications of law.82 The structure of German methods
avoids fixation on decisions of appellate courts. It responds to the
popular understanding of law as rules supplied by the legislature and
applied neutrally by courts and administrators. This is the popular
perception of law in the United States and the United Kingdom,8) as well

unterbreiteten Einzelfalles nicht nur gebunden ist, sondern die so !dar, unmiBverstiindlich und
vollstiindig sind, daB er sie ohne jede eigene Gestaltungsmoglichkeit nur anzuwenden bzw. zu,
,vollziehen' braucht. Der Richter sei nur der ,Mund des Gesetzes', meinte Montesquieu in einer
tausendmal zitierten Wendung . . .. Ich will hier nicht weiter untersuchen, was einen so in der
Praxis erfahrenen Mann zu so grundlegenden Irrtfunem veranlaBt haben konnte.... Die
Richtigkeit dieser These liegt vor jedermanns Augen, der auch nur einmal eine Rechtsnorm
ausgelegt und sie gar auf einen konkreten Fall angewandt hat.").

79.
80.

Idat6.
See, e.g., MAxEINER, supI8note 71, at 12.

81.

ARTHUR KAUFMANN, DAS VERFAHREN DER REClITSGEWINNUNG:

EINE RATIONALE

ANALYSE 2-6,29-30 (1999).

82. See Maxeiner, SUpI8 note 10, at 524.
83. See Patrick S. Atiyah, Lawyers and Rules: Some Anglo-American Comparisons, 37
Sw. L.J. 545, 548 (1983).
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as in Germany and France.84 The balance of this Article shows many
instances in which German legal methods promote legal certainty.

B.

Law Making

1.

Norm Orientation and Legal Certainty

In Germany, the statute--das Gesetc--is the fundamental concept
of all law. 8S It is the central category of legal thinking.86 It is the primary
source of German law.87 It is the basis for legal certainty.88 Among
statutes, the national code has fIrst place.89 Statutes are at the heart of
90
German legal education.
The rule of law consists of statutes. Where an American would say,
we have "a rule of law, not of men," a German would say, "statutes, not
men, govem.,,91 The statute is a legal norm. 92 It is a rule of law.93 The
content of a statute is a "norm sentence.,,94 The norm sentence is an
abstract rule of general applicability. It says that for a generally
described state of facts (Tatbestand), a certain legal result applies. 9s The
legal rule thus takes the form of a syllogism: whenever Tatbestand (T) is
realized in a concrete factual situation, then a certain legal result (R)
84. Sec Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common La~ Enlightened Civil Law;
Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization ofthe European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 82
(2001).
85. WALTER LEISNER, KRISE DES GESETZES: DIE AUFLOSUNG DES NORMENSTAATES 13
(2001) ("Das Gesetz-Grundbegriff allen Rechts:').
86. Id. at 5.
87. Id. at 13 ("Das Gesetz ist nicht nur ein Bereich des Rechts, es ist dessen pri.m3rer
Ausdruck."); HANS ScHNEIDER, GESETZGEBUNG: EIN LEHRBUCH 1 (3d ed. 2004) ("Das
parIarnentarisch beschlossene Gesetz bildet in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland den
Hauptbestandteil des geltenden Rechts."); c£ I KoNRAD COSACK, LEHRBUCH DES B"ORGERLICHEN
REcHTS 5 (7th ed. 1922).
88. Kissel, supra note 22, at 17 ("Gesetze sind die Basis der Rechtssicherheit.").
89.
cn COSACK. supra note 87, at 7.
90.
Cf. HANS-MARTIN PAWLOWSKI, ElNFOHRUNG IN DIE JURlSTISCHE MErnODENLEHRE:
EIN STIJDIENBUCH ZU DEN GRUNDLAGENFACHERN RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE UNO RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE
55 (2d ed. 2000) ("Juristen haben Rechtswissenschaft studiert; sie befassen sich in ihrem Studium
vomehmlich mit den staatlichen Gesetzen .... Die vorherrschenden Vorstellungen gehen daher
auch davon aus, daB Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft Gesetze seien und daB das Geschiift der
rechtswissenschaftlich ausgebildeten Juristen vomehmlich in der Anwendung von Gesetzen
bestehe.").
91. LEISNER, supra note 85, at 5 (''Nicht Menschen herrschen-Gesetze gelten.").
92. EiNFOHRUNGSGESETZ ZUM B"ORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHE [EGBGB] [Preamble to
Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBlj 604, as amended, art. 2 ("Gesetz im
Sinne des Biirgerlichen Gesetzbuchs und dieses Gesetzes ist jede Rechtsnorm:').
93. 1 COSACK, supra note 87, at 5, 20 (referring to "Rechtsregeln" and "Gesetzesregeln").
94. I LuoWlG ENNECCERUS & HANs CARL NIPPERDEY, ALLGEMEINER TElL DES
BURGERLICHREcHTS: EINLEHRBUCH 146 (14th ed. 1952)(Rechtssati).
95. Id. at 146 (Rcchtsfolge).
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applies. This is the major premise. The minor premise is that this
particular factual situation (S) fulfills the requirements of Tatbestand (T),
that is, it is a case ofT. The conclusion then logically follows that for the
factual situation S, legal consequence R applies. Schematically:
T--+ R

S

=

T

S --+ R

(For T-that is, for every case T-R applies)
(S is a case ofT)
(For S, R applies).96

The legal method of German law is based on norms and norm-thinking,
that is, norm sentences are applied to particular cases.97
Taken together, rules form an abstract legal order that governs all
behavior. ''The legal order is a structure of ought-norms. The idea of
their message is not to describe facts, but to prescribe conduct.,,98 This
objective order is contrasted with subjective rights of individual subjects.
The expression "objective right" designates the legal order that applies to
all. In contrast to that, one terms subjective right the right that pertains to
an individual against another or to an object.99 The legal order forms a
unity. 100 The norms are interrelated. Taken together, they form a
system. 101 While it may be that the ideal cannot be realized, the goal is a
system organized as if a single plan governed. Different laws should

96. KARL LARENZ, METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 261 (5th ed. 1983).
97. 3 FIKENTSCHER, supra note 65, at 638. This is not so far from the popular perception
of law in America. It is said that American law students come to law school with this idea in
mind. It is the job of the law school to "un-learn" this mentality. Sec Curran, supra note 84, at 82
("Perhaps the most frequently expressed complaint on the part of beginning law students in the
United States is that their professors don't tell them what the law is. This discomfort stems from
their not yet having 'un-learned'their still civil-law mentality, imported from the domain of their
prior life experience and prior intellectual training, from their still equating law with immutable
governing principles that, once learned, should, they believe, serve to solve and resolve all
questions of law. They enter law school committed to the concept that law school will teach them
the discrete guiding principles that resolve all legal disputes. This conception of law does not
tally with the common law, however. Common-law legal education in the United States thus
begins a process of teaching law students to 'un-learn' this approach when thinking of legal
issues, to reconceptualize law as a process of argumentation, as a body of cases which form a
point of departure for reasoning by analogy and distinction.").
98. REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, EINFOHRUNG IN DIE JURISTISCHE METHODENLEHRE 12 (3d ed.
1980) (author's translation).
99. 1 FIKENTSCHER, supra note 65, at 1; c£ KARL ENGISCH, EINFOHRUNG IN DAS
JURISTISCHE DENKEN 24 (7th ed. 1977).
100. See generally KARL ENGISCH, DIE EINHEIT DER REClITSORDNUNG (Wissenschaftliche
Buchgesellschaft 1987) (1935).
101. See generally CLAUS-WILHELM CANARIS, SYSTEMDENKEN UNO SYSTEMBEGRIFF IN
DER JURISPRUDENZ: ENTWICKELT AM BEISPIEL DES DEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS (1969).
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mesh with each other-none should command contrary action.
Inconsistency among nonns should be avoided. lo2
a.

Benefits for Legal Certainty of Viewing Law as a System of
Rules

Because rules are the focus of law, the German version of the rule
of law can and does give priority to fulfillment of the guidance function
of legal certainty.
In a rule-of-Iaw state, statutes govern. Because one cannot know
perfect justice, statutes determine what shall be treated as legally right. IOl
In the era of the adoption of the national codes, the statute was thought
identical to justice. The statute only need concern itself with equal
treatment under the law. That the statute itself was not so much a
statement of a shared conception of justice as a resolution of conflicting
social interests reached by those who made it did not diminish its
legitimacy as justice. Today, statutes are not thought to be identical to
justice. 104 But because they state what shall be treated as just, or at least
as legal, it is important that their content be clear and consistent and that
their application be sure and predictable. lOS
In German understanding, in a democracy, statutes are followed, or
at least tolerated, only if consistent with ideas ofjustice. Formal adoption
by parliament is not enough. Every statute, therefore, must have a
minimum connection to justice. At the very least, it must not contradict
basic ideas of justice. 106 Because statutes are binding on the executive
and the judiciary, it is essential that they mirror justice in substance and
application as much as reasonably possible.
Norm orientation promotes legal certainty by valuing more definite
rules. From the perspective of people subject to rules, norm orientation
demands relatively precise definition of the prerequisites for application
of a particular rule. lo7 In the text below, I discuss how norm orientation
102. PETER RAISCH, JURlSTISCHE METHODEN: YOM ANTIKEN RoM BIS ZUR GEGENWART
148-49 (1995) (Nonnspaltung).
103. MAx ROMELIN, DIE REcHTSSICHERHEIT 3 (l924).
104. See Josef Esser, Gesetzcsrationaiitfjt im Kodifikationszeitalter und heute, in 100
JAHRE OBERSTE DEUTSCHE JUSTIZBEHORDE: YOM REICHSJUSTIZAMT ZUM BUNDESMINISTERlUM
DERJUSTIZ 13,20-21 (1977).
105. See JAN ScHApp, METIIODENLEHRE DES ZMLRECHTS 8 (1998).
106. BVerlG Apr. IS, 1980,54 BVerfDE 53 (67-68) (F.R.G.) (noting that statutes may not

contradict basic ideas of justice); SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 37 (noting that not all statutes
directly implicate justice, since some are concerned only with establishing a particular order, e.g.,
driving on the right).
107. For an example comparing American imprecision with German precision in setting
out prerequisites, see James R. Maxeiner, Standarrl-Tenns Contracting in the Global Electronic
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facilitates predictability and review of rule application through legal
procedures.
System orientation promotes legal certainty by reducing conflicts
among rules. When rules are made, lawmakers pay close attention to the
place of the new rules in the existing system. As I discuss below, system
orientation in law making facilitates law finding and contributes to rule
coordination among different lawmakers.
The German approach to law making as norm-creation has
additional benefits, both for practical legal certainty in more certain
application of rules and, ironically, for flexibility in rule application.
These benefits flow from a more precise structure of decision making.
The benefits are: (1) identification of legal results, (2) identification of
decision makers where formal decisions are required, (3) explicit
granting of flexibility to decision makers through indefinite legal
concepts, and (4) explicit grants of discretion.
1. Identification of Legal Results. People subject to rules are
necessarily concerned with the consequences of those rules. Rules that
impose fmes or damages retrospectively, or even criminal sanctions, are
much more threatening and disruptive for planning than rules that merely
authorize prohibitions with future effect. Rules in German law closely
tie specific results to specific prerequisites. They can limit policy
application to prospective effect. los This permits increasing practical
determinacy without necessarily reducing rule flexibility deemed
desirable to deal with an uncertain future.
2. Identification of Decision Makers. Even in the best of
circumstances, some rules are indefmite. Indefmite rules need not
necessarily produce legal indeterminacy if their application is
nonetheless predictable. Predictability is enhanced when the behavior of
people allowed to invoke the rules and the behavior of those officials
charged with applying the rules are predictable. Higher predictability is
possible when who may invoke and who will apply the rules are known
beforehand. If that information is known, even relatively indefmite rules

Age: EuropcanAitematives, 28 YALE J.OO'L L. 109, 142, ISS, 172-73, 175 (2003) [hereinafter
Maxeiner, Standard- Tcnns Contracting] (comparing treatment of improper contract terms in
German and American Jaw, how American law mixes "procedural" and "substantive;' while
German law strictly separates the two). For a similar example in criminal law, compare James R.
Maxeiner, Note, Bane ofAmerican Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CoRNELL L. REv. 768,
800-01 (1977), with James R. Maxeiner, Constitutionalizing Forfeiture Law-The Gennan
Example, 27 AM. J. COMPo L. 635, 660-61, 663 (1979) (examining where American law mixes
"remedial" and ''punitive'' forfeiture of instrumentalities of crime).
108. Set: MAXEINER, supra note 71, at 58.
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may take on a definiteness in application that their indefInite language
would not suggest. This is yet another way in which practical
determinacy can be increased with limited or no effect on the flexibility
of rule application. German norms take this approach.l09 Legal certainty
in Germany makes prior identification of deciding judges a constitutional
requirement. Under Article 101 (1) of the German constitution (Basic
Law), no one may have his or her "statutory judge" taken away.1I0 Which
judge will decide any given case must be determined beforehand on the
basis of statute and other laws (e.g., an annual court plan for division of
duties.ylI
3. Indefinite Legal Concepts. German statutes use indermite legal
concepts in so-called general clauses to take into account the many sides
of life that do not lend themselves to defInition in clearly defined
concepts. By using general clauses, legislation need not be fragmentary,
but can be gap free. 1I2 While indefinite legal concepts threaten legal
certainty, different techniques are used to counter that threat. General
clauses do not permit judges simply to decide what they think is "fair" or
in the "general welfare."ll3 Instead, case groups develop in an almost
common-law manner.1l4 Only where there are no prior decisions do

109. Seeidch.7.
110. ORUNDGESETZ FOR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND [00] [Federal Constitution]
art. 101(1) (F.R.G.).
Ill. C£ JOACHIM HENKEL, ENGLAND: RECHTSSTAAT OHNE "GESElZLICHEN RICHTER"
(1971). Predictability of decision, as such, was not the origin of the requirement. Rather, the
purpose was to prevent the government from creating a special tribunal or engaging a friendly one
to decide a matter.
112. ENGISCH, supra note 99, at 124. German indelmite legal concepts are best known in
the United States through two general clauses of the German Civil Code, sections 138 and 242,
which have become part of American law through adoption in the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.). BORGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BOB] [Civil Code] Aug. 18, 1896, RGBI 195, as
amended, §§ 138, 242. Section 138 prohibits transactions that are against "good morals" (guten
Sitten), id § 138; its UC.C. counterpart is section 2-302, which permits nonenforcement of
"unconscionable" contracts or terms. UC.C. § 2-302 (2004). Section 242 requires performance
of contracts in "good faith," BGB § 242; its UC.C. counterpart is section 1-304 (formerly section
1-203). UC.C. § 1-304. For the origin of section 2-302, see Maxeiner, Standard-Tcnns
Contracting, supmnote 107, at 116-17. For the origin of section 1-304, see E. Allan Farnsworth,
Duties ofGood Faith and Fair Dealing Under the UNIDROIT Principles. Relevant Intemationai
Conventions, and National Laws, 3 TvL. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 47, 52 (1994).
113. See Franz Wieacker, Zur rechtstheoretischen Priizisierong des §242 BGB, in 2
AUSGEWAHLTE 8cHRIFrEN 195,203 (1983).
114. See, e.g., PALANDT, BORGERLICHES OESETZBUCH §§ 138, 242 (41st ed. 1982); 1
MONcHENER KoMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN OESETZBUCH: ALLGEMEINER TElL (§§ 1-240),
AGB-GESETZ § 138 (Franz Jiirgen Sacker ed., 3d ed. 1993) [hereinafter 1 MONcHENER
KoMMENTAR].
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judges have some freedom in reaching new solutions. liS Sometimes the
legislature notes the development of these case groups and enacts them
into law or introduces its own groups of cases. 1I6 Some indefmite clauses
are merely descriptive, that is, they relate to objects and events in the
physical world, such as darkness; they are empirical. Other general
clauses are normative and require a valuing, such as what constitutes
"good faith" or "good morals." Whether and just how these indefinite
concepts are binding is controversial. I have discussed that question
elsewhere. lI7
4. Discretion. Sometimes statutes deliberately do not bind decision
makers to one correct decision, but leave decision makers discretion to
reach their own decisions based on their own responsibility and
independent choice. It is used to permit a purposeful and just decision in
the individual case. liS What is probably the prevailing view in Germany
holds that discretion is appropriate only on the legal result, but not on the
Tatbestand side of the legal norm. That is, discretion in choice of action
is appropriate, but not in determination of the prerequisites for action.
This distinction marks a difference between indeftnite legal concepts and
discretion: the former leaves room for judgment in the prerequisites of
action, while the latter provides for freedom of action. I 19 I have discussed
elsewhere the different types of discretion and their control. l20
b.

Indefinite Concepts Contrasted with Discretion

While German statutes use both indefinite concepts and grants of
discretion to deal with future events that cannot be fully foreseen, they
use them differently. While they may freely grant discretion to
administrative authorities to make policy decisions, they eschew giving
115. Wieacker, supmnote 113, at 203. Wieacker also notes that section 242 looks to issues
of individual justice and not to general welfare (policy). Id at 196; cf. MAxElNER, supm note 71,
at 122.
116. Sec Maxeiner, Standard- Tenns, supm note 107, at 141-56, 177-82.
117. Sec MAxElNER, sLV'm note 71, at 12.
118. Sec ALLGEMEINES VERWALTIJNGSRECHT § 12 II 2 (Hans-Uwe Erichsen & Wolfgang
Martens eds., 6th ed. 1984).
119. Sec id; I HANS J. WOLFF & Orro BACHOF, VERWALTIJNGSRECHT: ElN STUDIENBUCH
§ 31 II (9th ed. 1974). Bachof uses this distinction to mark the division between room for
judgment (Bcurtci/ungsspiciraum) and discretion. Sec Otto Bachor, Bcurtciiungsspiciraum,
Ermcsscn und Unbestimmtcr Rcchtsbcgrifl, 1955 JURISTENZElTUNG 97, reprinted in Orro
BACHOF, WEGEZUM REcHTSSTAAT 157 (1979). See also the criticisms ofENGISCH, supmnote 99,
at 119 ("It is often only a question of legislative technique, whether discretion concepts are built
into the Tatbestand or the legal consequence." (author's translation»; and of HANS-JOACHIM KoCH,
UNBESTIMMTE REcHTSBEGRIFFE UNO ERMESSENSERMAClIDGUNGEN 1M VERWALTIJNGSRECHT 172-73
(1979).
120. SecMAxElNER, supmnote 71, at 41-44, 86-89.
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discretion to judges for such decisions. They do assign judges decisions
that require them to make value judgments in individual cases.
Administrative authorities may make policy-oriented decisions upon
their own responsibility; they may choose on the basis of current and
local interests among several possibilities. This freedom is acceptable
because administrative authorities are politically accountable. Where
statutes do not bind administrative authorities, they are nonetheless
obligated to exercise their freedom of choice in the public interest.
Relaxation of binding to statute for judicial decisions, on the other hand,
is preferably limited to situations where necessary to permit judges to do
justice in individual cases. Judges are not politically accountable; they
are guaranteed independence to permit them to do justice. 121 The German
legal system uses rules in this way to depoliticize certain decisions. It
attempts to separate legal questions from political ones. A legal question
should be subject to resolution without having to value public interest,
because the valuing of public interest is a peculiarly political task.122
2.

Process of Law Making and Legal Certainty

In Germany, special attention is given to assure the realization of
legal certainty in the statutes that are adopted. Central to the creation of
such rules is the rationality of their creation, i.e., their wording, their
content, and the procedure of their drafting. 12l The drafting of legislation
is closely controlled. Article 76(1) of the Basic Law provides that the
federal government, the upper house as an institution (Bundesraf), and
members of the lower house (Bundestafi) may introduce bills in the
federal parliament. 124 A commonplace in the United States--that a third
party drafts a law and tmds a lone legislator to introduce it in the
legislature-cannot happen in Germany. Under the long-standing rules
of the federal parliament, introduction of a bill requires the support of at
least five percent of the legislators (presently thirty-one members).12s The
minimum number corresponds to the threshold for a political party to
121. WOLFF & BACHOF, supra note 119, §§ 19 II, 28-30; see also 1 ERNST FORSTHOFF,
LEHRBUCH DES VERWALTUNGSRECHTS 119 (10th ed. 1973); Eduard Picker, Richterrecht and
Richterrechtsetzung, 39 JURISTENZEITUNG 153 (1984).
122. See generaJ.(y MAxEINER, supra note 71, at 122 (noting, inter alia, that generally in
German antitrust law, questions relating to judgments of what is "competition" and what is an
appropriate level of competition are decided by administrative authorities that are politically
accountable, and not by the ordinary courts, which are not subject to political control).
123. Karl-Peter Sommermann, Legislative Process and Rationality, in LAW REFORM AND
LAW DRAFTING 35 (2d ed. 1994); clEsser, supra note 104, at 20-21.
124. GG art. 76(1).
125. German Bundestag, Adoption of Legislation, http://www.bundestag.delhtdocs_eI
parliamentlfunctionllegislationlpassage.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2007).
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have a place in the legislature. In fact, however, most bills (about twothirds) are introduced by the federal government itself.126
The Bundesministerium der Justiz (Federal Ministry of Justice) has
an important role in all federal government legislative drafting. Indeed, it
is predominantly an institution for drafting legislation. It has very
limited administrative responsibilities. 127 Demonstrative of this is the fact
that the Federal Ministry of Justice has only about 722 employees.128 The
Bavarian State Ministry of Justice, in contrast, has nearly 19,000
employees, and it is the ministry for only one of sixteen stateS. 129
In practice, drafts of legislation come from the ministries rather than
from groups of legislators because the ministries have the necessary
110
expertise.
Government draft legislation emerges out of a process of
drafting and vetting that precedes the introduction of bills in the
parliament. The detailed procedures are set out in the Gemeinsame
GeschiiRsordnung der Bundesministerien (Common Ministerial Rules of
Procedure).Ill The ministerial officials charged with actual drafting
should already have knowledge of the subject area of the bill and of
relevant existing legislation. ll2 The Common Ministerial Rules of
Procedure tell them how to go about presenting a legislative proposal to
the ·government cabinet for possible submission to parliament. III A
legislative proposal consists of a draft statute, a formal justification for
the statute, and a cover sheet overview. l34 The justification is to set out,
among other matters, the goals and reasons for the draft statute, the
particular facts and the research on which the draft rests, what
126. RUPERT SCHICK & HERMANN J. SCHREINER, DIE GESETZGEBUNG DES BUNDES (17th ed.
2003), available at http://www.webarchiv/bundestag.delarchivel2005/0113/biclgesgeiOlgesgeb1.
html; accoro'ScHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 61-62; Sommennann, supra note 123, at 38-39.
127. Its responsibilities include the administration of the Federal Constitutional Court, the
other relatively few federal courts, and the relatively small federal prosecutor's office. See
FEDERAL MIN1STRY OF JUSTICE, TASKS AND ORGANISATION OF THE FEDERAL MINISTRY OF JUSTICE
3-4 (2006), available athttp://www.bmj.bund.delfilesl-/1335/infobroschure_englisch.pdf.
128. fd at 12.
129. Justiz in Bayern, Das Bayerische Staatsministerium der Justiz, http://www.justiz.
bayern.delministeriumlministerium (last visited Mar. 13, 2007). Its legislative duties are few, but
its administrative duties are many. It has about 14,000 employees in the courts and prosecution,
4500 in prison administration, and 175 in central administration. fd
130. SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 62.
131. GEMEINSAME GESCHAFTsoRDNUNG DER BUNDESMINISTERIEN (Bundesministerium des
Innem ed., 2006), available at http://www.staat-modem.delAnlageioriginaU 096884/GemeinsameGeschaeftsordnung-der-Bundesminsterium-GGO.pdf [hereinafter GOO] (translated in part in the
then-applicable version as Excerpt ofthe Common Ministerial Rules ofProcedure, Special Part
(GGOU), in LAW REFORM AND LAW DRAFTING, sUjJra note 123, at 85).
132. SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 65.
133. fd
134. fd

564

TULANE J. OF INT'L & COMP. LA W

[Vol. 15:541

alternatives exist, and what the consequences and costs would be if the
draft were adopted. '3'
The Common Ministerial Rules of Procedure give no indication as
to when it is appropriate to propose new legislation. Equally consistent
with the Common Ministerial Rules of Procedure are those initiatives
directed at reforming existing law and those aimed at creating new law.
The Common Ministerial Rules of Procedure have relatively little to say
about work preliminary to drafting. Before beginning work, the office of
the head of government, i.e., the chancellor's office, is to be informed of
the preparation of the proposal. The chancellor's office is to be regularly
informed of the proposal's progress. 136 If interests of state or local
governments are affected by the proposal, they are to be informed of the
anticipated proposal, and their views are to be obtained before beginning
work. 137 In the event that the proposal is opposed by one or more other
ministries, extensive preliminary work is not to begin without the
approval of the cabinet. '38 Comparative law studies commonly precede
major legislation. 139
Early in the drafting process and well before a fmal draft proposal is
submitted to the cabinet for consideration, the drafting ministry is to
obtain the participation of all affected ministries. It is to submit" the
draft l40 to the Federal Ministry of Justice and to the Federal Ministry of
the Interior so that they can review the draft for compliance with the
Basic Law. 141 The Federal Ministry of Justice is also to conduct a general
review of the draft both for its legal language and for its place in the legal
system. 142 The draft proposal is then circulated to affected state and local
governments (the latter through their associations), and the chancellor's
office is informed of their participation. 143 As appropriate, the draft also
may be circulated to experts and associations for comment, in which case
the legislature is to be notified of the circulation. '44 In some instances, for
135. GOO §§ 43-44.
136. Id §40.
137. Id § 41. Local governments are infonned and are given the opportunity to express
their views through their national associations. Id
138. Id § 45(5).
139. RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 14-15
(6th ed. 1998).
140. Drafts must also comply with requirements of the Federal Ministry of the Interior and
the Federal Ministry of Justice set out in their respective handbooks. GGO § 42(3)-(4). With
respect to the latter, see infia text accompanying notes 156-157.
141. GOO § 45.
142. Id § 46( 1) ("Zur Priifimg in rechtssystcmatischcr uncirechtsiOl711iichcr Hinsich!').
143. Id § 47.
144. Id § 48(2).
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example labor legislation, statutes require consultation with affected
groupS.14S
Thus, by the time a proposal reaches the cabinet, it has already been
the subject of much review. If the cabinet adopts the proposal, it then
submits it as a "government draft" to both houses of the legislature. The
procedures before the Bundesrat need not be discussed here. Before the
Bundestag, the draft statute, now a bill in American terminology, must go
through three readings. Upon introduction, the bill is read and then
referred to a particular committee. The committee may, but need not,
hold its meetings in public and may, but need not, invite affected parties
to testify. The committee then makes its recommendations to adopt or
reject the bill as written or to adopt it with amendments that it
recommends. It then returns the bill to the floor for a second reading.
Usually, the Bundestag follows the recommendations of the committee,
because the makeup of the committee mirrors the legislature itself. On
the floor, individual legislators may propose amendments in writing. To
have a reasonable chance of success, they must call for specific changes
in words, sentences, paragraphs, or other particulars of the bill. If no
changes are made to the bill, the Bundestag may proceed immediately to
the third and final reading. If there are changes, the process is repeated
with the changes, the bill is read a third time, and then voted up or down.
Amendments proposed at the third reading serve largely to make political
points. 146
The result of this procedure is that the parliament usually makes
only a few changes in the text of the government drafts. 147 Because the
government drafts are usually well-drafted technically, legal certainty
should be enhanced.
Last-minute compromises that produce
l48
incomprehensible statutory language presumably occur infrequently in
Germany. But there is an obvious cost in a diminution of democratic
participation in law making. In defense of the German approach, it is .
argued that the mere possibility that the legislature, above all through its
committees, will engage in a searching examination of the bill is
sufficient to assure high quality and moderate drafting. 149 That may be,
145. SCHNEIDER, supmnote 87, at 70-72.
146. This paragraph is based on id at 80-89.
147. Id at 93 ("Das Parlament ist Gesetzgelber, aber nicht Gesetzesrnacher [i.e., the
parliament is the giver of statutes, but not the maker of statutes].").
148. Cf. Peter M. Goodloe, Simplification-A Fedem! Legislative Perspective, 105 DICK.
L. REv. 247, 249 (2001).
149. Thomas Ellwein, Gesetzgebung, Regierung, Verwaltung, in HANoaUCH DES
VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLlK DEUTSCHLAND 1093, llO5 (Ernst Benda et a!. eds.,
1983); SCHNEIDER, supmnote 87, at 93.
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but the procedure tends to relegate participation in creating legislation to
the predraft stage.
'
According to a recent report commissioned by the European Union,
"better statutes" are an integral part of the European Union's "goal of
becoming the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
in the world."ISO The report, after setting out common principles for
legislation,''' details recommended practices in two principal parts. One
part consists of recommended practices for legislation generally; 152
another part consists of matters peculiar to the European Union.1S3 The
report is another sign of the increase in Europe and Germany in recent
years in the craft of drafting statutes. Since about 1980, there has been a
relatively extensive scholarship on the science of statutory drafting
( GesetzgebungsJehre).IS4 Indeed, a society and journal devoted to the
subject are now each about two decades old. ISS The practice of drafting is
aided by a 240 page guide issued by the Federal Ministry of Justice that
is now in its second edition: 56 Government drafts of legislation are
150. DER MANDELKERN-BERICHT AuF DEM WEG ZU BESSEREN GESE1ZEN: ABscHwSSBERJCHT 7
(2002), available at http://www.staat-modern.delAnlageioriginaU48848IModerner-StaatModeme-Verwaltung-Der-MandeIkem-Bericht-Auf-dem-Weg-zu-besseren-Gesetzen.pdf
(translated as MANDELKERN GROUP ON BETIER REGULATION: FINAL REPORT 9 (2002), available at
http://www.nnr.selpdflMandeIkem.pdt).Itis suggestive of a different understanding of statutes in
Germany than in English-speaking countries that, where the English version of the report refers to
regulation, the German version speaks of statutes (Gesctze) or legislating (Rechtssctzung). See
id

151. MANDELKERN GROUP ON BETIER REGULATION: FINAL REPORT, supra note 150, at 910 (listing the common principles for legislation: necessity, proportionality, subsidiarity,
transparency, accountability, accessibility, and simplicity).
152. Jd at 11-53.
153. Jd at 55-71.
154. See, e.g., GESETZGEBUNG: KRmSCHE UBERLEGUNGEN ZUR GESETZGEBUNGSLEHRE
UND GESETZGEBUNGSTECHNIK (Giinther Winkler & Bernd Schlicher eds., 1981) [hereinafter
GESETZGEBUNG]; GESETZGEBUNGSLEHRE-GRUNOLAGEN-ZUGANGE-ANWENDUNG (Waldemar
Schreckenberger ed., 1986); GESETZGEBUNG UNO REcHTSKULTUR: lNTERNATIONALES SYMPOSION
SALZBURG 1986 (Heinz Schaffer ed., 1987); METHODIK DER GESETZGEBUNG: LEGISTISCHE
RIClITLINIEN IN THEORIE UNO PRAxIS (Theo Ohlinger ed., 1982) [hereinafter METHODIK DER
GESETZGEBUNG (Ohlinger»); PETER NOLL, GESETZGEBUNGSLEHRE (1973); SCHNEIDER, supra note
87; STUDIEN zu EINER THEORIE DER GESETZGEBUNG 1982 (Harald Kindermann ed., 1982);
THEORIE UNO METHODEN DER GESETZGEBUNG:
KoLLOQUIUM DER DEUTSCHEN UND
SCHWEDISCHEN GESELLSCHAFTEN FOR REcHTSVERGLEICHUNG IN FREIBURG YOM 28-31 MARz
1982 (1983).
155. See GUNNAR FOLKE SCHUPPERT, GUTE GESETZGEBUNG: BAUSTEINE EINER KRITISCHEN
GESETZGEBUNGSLEHRE (special issue of 18 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESETZGEBUNG (2004». Zeitschrift
Iiir Gesetzgebung has been published since 1985. See also ZUM GEGENWARrIGEN STAND DER
GESETZGEBUNG IN DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND:
ZEHN JAHRE "DEUTSCHE
GESELLSCHAFT FOR GESETZGEBUNG"-ZEHN JAHRE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR GESETZGEBUNG (Ulrich
Karpen ed., 1998).
156. BUNDESMINISTERIUM DER JUSTIZ, HANDBUCH DER RECHTSFORMLICHKEIT (2d ed.
1999). For excerpts of similar directions used in Austria and Switzerland, see GESETZGEBUNG,
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required to follow it. ls7 Of course, creating clear and authoritative rules is
only the first step toward applying rules to concrete cases and giving
subjects guidance in law. The next Subpart addresses law finding.
C.

Law Finding

Law fmding (Rechtsfindung) in Germany includes statutory
interpretation and, where there is no applicable statute, law creation
through judicial decision (Rechtssch6pfimgor Rechtsfortbildung).ls8
1.

Law Finding Generally

Finding the applicable rule is ordinarily not a major issue in
Germany. This is so notwithstanding an "inflation of statutes" and an
''unending flood of norms."IS9 It is so notwithstanding an increase in
publication of court decisions through specialty periodicals and Internet
distribution. It is so notwithstanding increased integration of the
European Union and the resulting EU regulations and directives that
affect German law. The problems seen with the flood of rules are
significant challenges to legal certainty. Critics complain of reduced
continuity and increased complexity of statutes. They see instability
reducing the stature of statutes among the citizenry generally and
contributing to a transfer of responsibility for the law to specialists. l60
But fmding rules remains manageable. Explanations include: minimal
federal system conflicts, national codes and systematic legislation, and
judicial responsibility for law finding.
a.

Minimal Federal System Rule Conflicts

As discussed below, there are relatively few instances in which laws
of different jurisdictions apply and conflict. Legislation seeks to resolve
issues of conflict before enactment and enforcement. Usually, either

supra note 154, at 223-84. For a discussion of the role of such directives in legislation, see
supra note 154.
157. GOO § 42(4).
158. Fikentscher, in his six-section description of the prevailing approach to legal methods
in Germany, devotes a section to each ("Auslcgung der Rechtssiitze' and "Rechtsfbrtbildung'). 3
FlKENTSCHER, supra note 65, at 657, 701 (1976). Larenz, in the six chapters of his systematic
part, likewise allocates a chapter to each ("Dic Auslcgung der Gcsctze' and "Mcthodcn
nchtcrlichen Rechtsfbrtbildung'). LARENZ, supra note 96, chs. 4-5.
159. LEISNER, supra note 85, at 124-25 (speaking of "GcsctzesinDatiorl' and "Unendlichc
NormDul').
160. Sec, c.g., id. at 123-24 (referring to "Unbcstiindigkcil' leading to ~'Vcrlust der
'Gcsctzcskralf·').
METHODIK DER GESETZGEBUNG (Ohlinger),
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federal law or the law of a particular state applies. This is true not only
for laws issued by GerrilaIly's federal and state governments, it is also
true as between Gennan and EU law. Most EU law takes the fonn of
directives, which are effective only as implemented through national
legislation. 161
National codes cover civil law (obligations, property, family and
inheritance law), commercial law, criminal law, criminal procedure, and
civil procedure. These codes are very stable. They play the preeminent
roles in the areas they govern. Even where they do not specifically apply,
they provide the bedrock on which further analysis rests. 162 They are
supplemented by other important national statutes, e.g., those dealing
with antitrust. Standards of legislation remain relatively high. The rules
fit together, if not seamlessly, at least without major inconsistencies.
This system is enhanced by a system of legal publishing that
increases content clarity and application predictability. Every code and
most major statutes have systematic, privately made commentaries. 163
These commentaries set out the statutory provisions. But unlike the
annotated codes of the United States, which merely provide additional
materials for lawyers to review, the Gennan code commentaries do much
more than that: they systematically discuss the statutory provisions, their
purposes, and their implications. They review interpretative questions
that have arisen or may arise under statutes. They report how courts and
scholars have addressed those issues. Some commentaries are written by
the drafters of the laws. themselves. l64 Some have continued for more
than a century and are regularly updated by scholars and practitioners in
16s
the field. Some enjoy enonnous authority and can be readily relied on
Huge, multivolume "large"
for their interpretation of the law.
commentaries treat just about every issue that might arise. Some onevolume commentaries consist of more than 3000 oversized octavo
l66
pages. Almost all lawyers own or have ready access to these "short"
161. EC Treaty, supm note 46, art. 249.
162. Cf. George P. Fletcher, Three Nearly Sacred Books in Restem Law, 54 ARK. L. REv.
I, 12 (2001) (describing the French Code civil as the "framework and the starting offpoint" for
dealing with issues of private law).
163. See, e.g., PETER ULMER ET AL., AGB-GESETZ: KoMMENTAR ZUM GESETZ ZUR
REGELUNG DES REcHTS DER ALLGEMElNEN GESCHAFrSBEDlNGUNGEN (9th ed. 2001).
164.

~

e.g., id

165. ~ e.g., J. VON STAUDlNGERS, KoMMENTAR ZUM BORGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH MIT
EUNFOHRUNGSGESETZ UNO NEBENGESETZEN-100 JAHRE BGB-l00 JAHRE STAUDlNGERBEITRAGE ZUM SYMPOSIUM VOM 18.-20. JUNI 1998lN MONcHEN (Micheael Martinek & Patrick L.
Sellier eds., 1999).
166. The leading "short" commentary to the Gennan Civil Code, known as the "PaJandf'
after its fIrst editor-now long deceased-is in its sixty-sixth edition (2006). It has 2901 pages of
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commentaries. Within a few minutes, generalist lawyers can provide
reasonably reliable answers to a wide range of legal questions outside
their fields. Common-law observers have long been amazed by this
phenomenon.

b.

Iura novit curia

Another reason that finding the law is considerably easier in
Germany than in the United States is because in German litigation,
judges-not lawyers-have the responsibility for fmding the law. The
principle iura novit curia applies. Lawyers present the facts to judges;
judges apply the law (cia mihi factum, clabo tibijus). To facilitate judges'
familiarity with the law, they specialize. Not only are there separate civil,
criminal, administrative, labor, tax, patent, and social courts, within those
courts there is also a division of labor. Cases under one type of statute
are assigned to particular panels of judges, while those under another are
assigned to different panels. As a result, judges are likely to be familiar
with the legal issues applicable to a case.
Because courts are responsible for knowing the law, lawyers who
l67
bring cases need not be experts in the field to evaluate cases -they
need know just enough to confirm that their clients have reasonable
cases. Lawyers can be bystanders while courts consider what law to
apply. Courts develop the legal theories on which their judgments are
based. Normally these are straightforward. Where there is more than
one possibly applicable claim, courts are required to consider the facts
under all potentially applicable statutes. The constitutional right to be
heard guaranteed by Article 103(1) of the Basic Law precludes courts
from resting their decisions on law of which they have not made parties
aware. If a party disputes the law to be applied, or proposes application

small type and uses a set of abbreviated words all its own. It weighs in at 2565 grams, or close to
six pounds. It is, however, outweighed by its code of civil procedure counterpart, the
"Baumbach;' in its sixty-fifth edition (2006) at 3030 pages and 2742 grams. See http://www.
buchhandel.de (search "Palandt' and "Baumbach Zivilprozessordnung') (last visited Jan. 26,
2007).
167. EA. Mann, Fusion oftheLegaI Professions?, 93 L.Q. REv. 367, 370 (1977). Lawyers
themselves must still know the law. The costs of research into what the law is cannot be
recovered from a losing party. No. 12 W 113/02, 22 0 589/97, Judgment (OberJandesgericht
Frankfurt am Main [OLG] [Court of Appeals Frankfurt] Aug. 5, 2002) (F.R.G.), http://web2.
justiz.hessen.delmigration/rechtsp.nsf/bynoteidlC3C61 B4837ED3F88C 1256D7F003C9D31 ?
Opendocument.
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of other laws, a court must in its decision of the case deal with the
arguments raised by the parties. l68
Application of the doctrine of iura nont curia increases
predictability of law application. A party confronted with potential
litigation can have a greater level of confidence that the law that the party
believes applies actually will be applied. On the other hand, judges who
are specialized by statute, who are considered bound by statute, and
whose promotion depends upon confidence in their judging ability, are
not quick to accept counsel's suggestions to innovate in rmding legal
claims.
2.

Statutory Interpretation and Binding to Statute

A lawyer in Germany is apt to think rrrst of statutes as the legal
limit on judicial or administrative decision. Binding the state authority to
statutes is a central element in the German ideal of the rule-of-Iaw state.
It is explicitly adopted in Article 20 of the Basic Law: the executive and
the administration of justice are bound to "statute and justice."I69 Its
practical implementation is a central task of modem German theory of
legal method.
.
The ideal of the rule-of-Iaw state is usually traced to the reaction to
the so-called "cabinet justice" of the absolutist monarchs of the
eighteenth century. The Enlightenment brought demands for a fully clear
and predictable legal system, which would eliminate all arbitrariness (or
cabinet interference) from the application of law. Statutory interpretation
seemed to threaten this ideal. Strict binding of the judge to the statute
became the goal, while elimination of all judicial creativity became a
sought-after· by-product. The Prussian General Law of 1794 (Allgemeines
Landrecht (ALR)) used over 19,000 paragraphs to try to answer every
conceivable contingency.170 Its judges were to apply the law to the facts
mechanically-to subsume the individual case under the appropriate
statutory provision and to serve as the "mouthpiece" or as the "slave" of

168. BVerfG, Oct. 14, 1998, docket number 2 BvR 205/91, para. 8, available at
http://www.bverfg.de/; c£ WOLFGANG GRUNSKY, GRUNDLAGEN DES VERFAHRENSRECHTS: EINE
VERGLEICHENDE DARSTELLUNG VON ZPO, FGG, VwGO, FGO, SOO 233-34 (2d ed. 1974).
169. GG art. 20 (author's translation).
170. Reinhard Zimmennann, Statuta Sunt Stricte Interpretanda? Statutes and the
Common Law: A Continental Perspective, 56 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 315, 325 (1997) (characterizing
the ALR as "the last great attempt to enact a piece of legislation designed to provide an exhaustive
regulation, down to the most intimate detail and the fmest differentiation").
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the statute. 171 The ALR forbad judges to interpret it and directed them to
refer questions of interpretation to a special legislative commission.172
The ALR failed in its attempt to deny all judicial creativity; 173
Prussian judges were soon released to interpret the law. The modem
l74
history of German theory of legal methods begins here and often seems
to be a struggle between effectuating a binding of judges to statutes and
avoiding the negative effects of excessive binding. By the nineteenth
century, the concept of strict binding of judges to statutes was already
shaken and given up as the ideal. 17s Germany went from a prohibition of
interpretation to a prescription for interpretation. 176
Much of the theory of German statutory construction is similar to
American theory.177 As in the United States, there are canons of
interpretation. As in the United States, there are different theories of
interpretation, e.g., objective theories of various types and subjective
theories of different ilk.178 In Germany, the prevailing view is that, while
the subjective will of the legislature is to be taken into account, the
171. See WILHELM EBEL, GESCHIClITE DER GESETZGEBUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND 78-79
(1958); ENGISCH, supra note 99, at 106-07; O.A. Germann, Rechtssicherheit, in O.A. GERMANN,
METHODISCHE GRUNDFRAGEN 54,57 (1946); O.A. GERMANN, PROBLEME UNO METHODEN DER
RECHTSFINDUNG 281 (1965) [hereinafter GERMANN, PROBLEME]; REGINA OOOREK,
R.!CHTERK()NIG ODER SUBSUMPTIONSAUTOMAT? ZUR JUSTlZTHEORIE 1M 19. JAHRHUNDERT (1986).
An analogous conception of the judge's role appeared in the United States in the late nineteenth
century and was sharply attacked in the twentieth century as "mechanical jurisprudence:' "the
phonograph theory:' or as formalism. Sec MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 11214 (1933); RoBERT SAMUEL SUMMERS, INSTRUMENTALISM AND AMERICAN LEGAL THEORY 137-39
(1982).
172. ALLGEMEINES LANDRECHT FOR DIE PREUBISCHEN STAATEN VON 1794, at 58 (Hans
Hattenhauer ed., 2d ed. 1994) [hereinafter ALR] (Einleitung § 46: "Bey Entscheidungen
streitiger Rechtsfiille darf der Richter den Gesetzen keinen andern Sinn beylegen, als welcher aus
den Worten, und dem Zusammenhange derselben, in Beziehung auf den streitigen Gegenstand,
oder aus dem niichsten unzweifelhaften Grunde des Gesetzes, deutlich erhellt." Einleitung § 47:
"Findet der Richter den eigentlichen Sinn des Gesetzes zweifelhaft, so muB er, ohne die
prozeBfiihrenden Parteyen zu benennen, seine Zweifel der GesetzcommiBion anzeigen, und auf
deren Beurtheilung antragen:').
173. Zimmermann, supra note 170, at 325-26.
174. Wolfgang Fikentscher (with Kant) & Karl Larenz (with Savigny) begin their historical
surveys of German legal methods at the tum of the nineteenth century. See 3 FlKENTSCHER, supra
note 65, at 13 (1976); LARENZ, supra note 96, at 11; see also GorrFRIED DIETZE, KANT UND DER
RECHTSSTAAT 46-48 (1982).
175. ENGISCH, supra note 99, at 107; sec also GERMANN, PROBLEME, supra note 171, at
282.
176. Giinter Hirsch, President of the Federal Supreme Court, Address at the Bucerius Law
School, Der Richter im Spannungsverhiiltnis von Erster und Dritter Gewalt (Oct. 1, 2003), in DIE
ZEIT, No. 41, 2003, available at http://zeus.zeit.deltextlredenlbildung...,und_kulturlhirsch_bls
("Vom Auslegungsverbot zum Auslegungsgebot").
177. Robert Alexy & Ralf Dreier, Statutory Interpretation in the Federal Republic of
Ocnnany, in INTERPRETING STATUTES, supra note 64, at 73,82-91.
178. Seegenerally3 FlKENTSCHER, supra note 65, at 13 (discussing various theories).
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objective will determines the interpretation. The classic view of Savigny
is the preferred approach: the judge is to look to the "concept inherent in
the statute."I79 Professor Reinhard Zimmermann states the principal
guides:
On the Continent we have managed to shake off the self-imposed
fetters of a literalist approach to statutory interpretation. German courts
and legal writers are guided, today, by the four elements of interpretation as
analysed particularly clearly by Friedrich Carl von Savigny: they take
account of (1) the literal meaning of the words or the grammatical structure
of a sentence, (2) the legislative history, (3) the systematic context and (4)
the design, or purpose, of a legal rule. ISO

Such is the similarity of these guides to American canons that one
may wonder whether results for certainty of statutory interpretation
should not likewise be similar. Indeed, the principal difference between
the two approaches seems to be that American canons are more
numerous and are more likely to be seen themselves to be binding.
Space does not allow further consideration here of comparative statutory
interpretation; reference may be made to efforts already made in that
direction. Here, however, mention can be made of how legal methods
can contribute to legal certainty in connection with statutory
interpretation.
Statutory interpretation in Germany takes place against a backdrop
of norm orientation. As already discussed, a norm consists of stated
prerequisites for a stated legal consequence. Norm orientation has at
least two salutary effects for legal certainty in statutory interpretation.
First, norm orientation means that statutes as norms have existence
179. The view of the President of the Federal Supreme Court is instructive:
Nach stiindiger Rechtsprechung ist der Wille des Gesetzgebers zwar als ein
wesentlicher Aspekt bei der Auslegung zu beriicksichtigen, hat jedoch im Kollisionsfall
objektiv-teleologischen Kriterien zu weichen. MaBgebend fUr die Interpretation eines
Gesetzes ist der in ihm zum Ausdruck kommende objektivierte Wille des
Gesetzgebers. Es gilt immer noch die klassische Defmition von Savigny, nach der
Auslegung, "die Rekonstruktion des dern Gesetz innewohnenden Gedankens" ist,
wobei es ibm nicht urn subjektive VorsteUungen der am Gesetzgebungsverfahren
Beteiligten ging, sondern urn das, was diese irn Aligemeininteresse denken muBten. Es
geht also nicht darum, was sich der "Gesetzgeber"-wer immer das auch sein rnagbeim ErlaB des Gesetzes "gedacht hat," sondern darum, was er verniinftigerweise
gewollt haben soUte.
Hirsch, supra note 176.
180. Zimmermann, supra note 170, at 320 (citing I FRlEDRICH CARL VON SAVlGNY,
SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN R()MISCHEN REcHTS 206 (1840) (translated as SYSTEM OF THE RoMAN LAW
(William Holloway trans., 1979) (1867»). Zimmermann notes that around this "nucleus" are
suggested historical and EU-hannonizing interpretations observing the importance of the Basic
Law. But it is the teleological argument that is encountered most frequently. Id
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independent of the cases that they detennine. Judges who apply them
should not interpret them out of existence, but should contribute to their
faithful construction as rules to be applied in future cases. Second, norm
orientation permits uncertainties of statutory interpretation in the
prerequisites for action to be moderated by practical certainty in clear
identification of what a norm's legal consequences are and through clear
designation of who may invoke the norm. Norm orientation permits a
structuring of the process of statutory interpretation.
a.

Statutory Norms Have Importance of Their Own Apart from
Decision of Individual Cases

It is the responsibility of judges charged with interpreting norms to
honor them and to make them precise and functional. Common lawyers
often criticize civilian judges for thinking fIrst of norms and only
secondarily of decisions in individual cases. But giving attention to
statutes as norms applicable in the future can pay big dividends in
fulfIlling their guidance function. Binding to statute requires that judges
not decide contrary to statute. This does not mean judges are blindly
bound; they are bound, not to the mere words of the statute, but to its
"sense and purpose." Finding this limit is the task of statutory
interpretation. lSI Judges are to look fIrst to the language of statutes
themselves and not to decisions applying statutes for their interpretation.
In the United States, where interpretations of statutes receive binding
force, judges look first to those decisions and only secondarily to the
statutes themselves. The guiding force of statutes is diminished. That
German judges look rrrst to statutory language does not mean that they
ignore prior judicial interpretations.
Honoring statutes as norms means that German judges should not
rely on legislative history to turn statutory language upside down. To be
sure, in doubtful cases they do look to legislative materials to determine
the intention of the historic legislature and to identify the purpose of the
statute. IS2 The types of materials that they most often consult are
competing drafts, the comments of the reviewing committee, and the
official justifIcations that accompanied the draftS.IS3 Since the drafting
process is more tightly controlled than in the United States, judges' use
of legislative history is less problematic.

181. 1 ENNECCERUS & NIPPERDEY, supnmote 94, at 194.
182. LARENZ, s~nlnote 96, at 313-19.
183. Id at 316.
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Statutory Interpretation Is Made Practically More Predictable
Through Institutional Organization

Where statutory language is indefinite, practical legal certainty may
be attained by making the probable interpretation predictable. This is
more often the case when those charged with interpreting the statutes are
clearly identified. The German legal system uses norm orientation to
concentrate interpretation of particular statutes with particular judges. In
Germany, judges are not usually interpreting statutes for the first time.
German judges are specialized. Not only are there separate courts for
civil and criminal matters, there are also separate administrative, labor,
fiscal, social welfare, and intellectual property courts. This means that
the judges doing the interpretation are interpreting statutes with which
they are usually already familiar. This is all the more so, because within
these very courts the judges specialize further in specific panels. Thus,
for example, a group of criminal law judges will decide most of the cases
relating to certain specific types of crimes. In some areas of the law that
are especially prone to variant interpretation and yet are of particular
importance, e.g., antitrust law, the principle of concentration is carried
still further and all matters of a particular type will be assigned to a
particular court within the state. Moreover, in order to assure consistent
interpretation and application, courts are sometimes permitted, and other
times required, to refer questions of interpretation to other courts. The
best known of these referrals are referrals to the Federal Constitutional
Court and to the ECl But referrals are possible within Germany among
lower level courts as well.
3.

Judicial Law Making

Even the ALR, which tried to provide a gap-free legal order that
anticipated every eventuality, acknowledged that it might not cover
everything. The ALR provided that if a judge found no statute that would
decide the case before him, he should decide the case according to the
general principles of the ALR, by analogy to other statutes, and through
using his own best judgment. 184 That is not to say, however, that this code,
which prohibited its own interpretation/ 85 was ready to endorse case law;
quite the contrary was true. The very next part of the ALR provided that
184. ALR, supm note 172, at 59 (Einleitung § 49: "Findet der Richter kein Gesetz,
welches zur Entscheidung des streitigen Falles dienen konnte, so mull er zwar nach den in dem
Gesetzbuche angenommenen allgemeinen Gnmdsiitzen, und nach den wegen iihnlicher Hille
vorhandnen Verordnungen, seiner besten Einsicht gemaB erkennen:').
185. See supm text accompanying notes 170-172.
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the judge who had to decide such a case was required to notify the head
of the judicial branch of this deficiency in the statutes. l86 The following
three sections of the law provided legislative procedures for remedying
this deficiency.187
Long ago, the German legal system abandoned the ideal of a gapfree statutory legal order. In the mid-1960s, the annual report of the
Federal Supreme Court explicitly acknowledged that law in practice had
always been a mixture of statutory and case law. There was no question
whetherthere was case law, there was only a question of its extent l88
The Federal Constitutional Court has recognized that, while a case
for a gap-free legal order would well suit the requirement of legal
certainty, practically the goal is unattainable. ls9 Within the existing
framework of statutes, judges may and do fill gaps. "The judicial
decision then fills this gap according to the standards of practical reason
and the 'community's well-founded general ideas of justice.",I90 The
court held that such "creative law rmding" had always been consistent
with the Basic Law. 191
While there is a broad consensus that gap-filling is permissible,
how gap-filling should be implemented is controversial. 192 Even basic
issues, such as whether gaps occur often or rarely, or whether judicial
development of law (richterliche Rechtsfortbildung) is qualitatively
different from or an extension of statutory construction, are debated. 193
186. ALR, supra note 172, at 59 (Einleitung § 50: "Er muB aber zugleich diesen
vermeintlichen Mangel der Gesetze dem Chef der Justiz so fort anzeigen:').
187. ld Section 51 provided, in the interest of legal certainty, that whatever action was
taken to remedy the deficiency could not affect the case that had raised the issue. Section 52
prescribed obtaining an expert report on the deficiency before raising the issue with the statute
commission. ld
188. Quoted in Franz Jfirgen Sacker, Ein/eitung, in 1 MONcHENER KoMMENTAR, supra note
114, at 28 (citation omitted).
189. BVerfU Feb. 14, 1973, 34 BVerfUE 269 (287) (ER.G.) ("Soraya") ("[D]ie
grundsiitzliche LiickenJosigkeit der positiven staatlichen Rechtsordnung [ist] ein Zustand, der als
prinzipielles Postulat der Rechtssicherheit vertretbar, aber praktisch unerreichbar ist.").
190. [d, translatcdinAlexy & Dreier, supra note 177, at 80.
191. BVerfUE 34, 269 (287).
192. Alexy & Dreier, supra note 177, at 80.
193. Sec KAUFMANN, supra note 81, at 8 (defending his view that the difference is gradual
rather than that there are two kinds); LARENZ, supra note 96, at 351 (seeing a continuum);
PAWLOWSKI, supra note 90, at 58, 61 (observing at the former page that gaps occur frequently and
on the latter discussing the position that there is a sharp difference between statutory
interpretation and judicial law development); Bernd Riithers, Dcmokratischer Rcchtsstaat oder
oligarchischer Richterstaat?, 57 JURISTENZEI11JNG 365, 366 (2002) (insisting that there must be a
strict separation between the two); Zimmermann, supra note 170, at 320-21 ("[The teleological
argument], usually, determines whether a legal rule may be restricted or extended beyond its
wording, or whether it may be applied per analogiam. Whether these later forms of legal
reasoning may still be classified as 'interpretation,' or whether we have to refer to 'judicial
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Particularly brisant is whether judicial law development can develop law
that is contrary to statutes. After an initial decision that seemed to permit
such decisions, the Federal Constitutional Co~ stepped back and
signaled a more restrictive view. l94 For present purposes, it is sufficient to
sketch the problem of judicial development of law.
Pure judicial development of law is problematic because it calls into
question the legitimacy of the law thus created. This is the reason it is
argued that there should be a strict separation between construction and
application of existing law on the one hand and judicial development of
new law on the other. Judges are constitutionally bound to law and
statute. They are "servants" of the statutes. Where there is an applicable
norm that the judge is called upon to construe, the judge is strictly bound
to the statutory norm and is to apply the statute without regard to
personal feelings. When there are no applicable norms, how are judges
to decide? If one answers, as article l(II) of the Swiss civil code seems
to, that judges should decide as the legislature, then they become
"substitute legislators" and the "lords" of the legal system. 19S Judges are
not, however, it is argued, well suited for this role. Judges do not have the
resources and other means to understand and deal with social problems
like a legislature does. Judges do not have political legitimacy to make
policy decisions. l96 The Federal Supreme Court recently signaled its
discomfort with extensive judicial legislation. 197 For all of these reasons,

development of the law' is a disputed though practically irrelevant question."). The discussion is
usually carried on in the tenns of the difference between applying law (Rechtsanwendung) and
judicial law development (richtcrlichc Rechtsfortbiklung).
194. Sec Alexy & Dreier, supra note 177, at 80-81; HANS-JOACHIM KocH & HELMUT
ROBMANN, JURISllSCHE BEGRONDUNGSLEHRE 254-57 (1982). Compare BVerfU 34, 269, with
BVerfU Oct. 11, 1978,49 BVerfUE 304 (ER.G.). The issue is distinct from that posed by the
Nazi dictatorship, i.e. "statutory injustice" (gesctzlichcs Unrecht). Sec Radbruch, Statutory
LaWICSSllCSS, supra note 26, at 1-7; ENGISCH, supra note 99, at 175. Binding to statute alone
{"statute is statute" (Gcsclz ist GesctZ}) demanded correction. Legal certainty could not be an
absolute value that would override all interests of justice. Accordingly, Article 20 of the Basic
Law binds the government not to statute (GesetZ} alone, but to "statute and justice" (Geselz und
Recht). GG art. 20. The Federal Constitutional Court has given Radbruch's cautious resolution
of the problem recognition: "positive law, secured by statute and state authority, has priority, even
if in content it is unjust and impractical [unzwechnaDI8l, unless the contradiction between the
positive statute and justice reaches such an intolerable degree, that the statute must give way to
justice as 'false law' [unrichtigcs Rechtj." BVerfU Dec. 18, 1953, 3 BVerfUE 225 (232) (ER.G.)
(author's translation).
195. Riithers, supranote 193, at 366.
196. PAWLOWSKI, supra note 90, at 64-65.
197. Sec, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof, GroBer Senat fUr Strafsachen [BGH Gr. Sen. St.]
[Federal Court of Justice en bane panel to resolve conflicts among the Senate for criminal cases]
Mar. 3,2005, 50 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES fN STRAFSACHEN [BGHSt] 41
(64) (ER.G.). The Great Senate of the Federal Supreme Court appealed to the German legislature
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at the very least, it is argued, there should be clear distinction made
198
between two very different functions. If judges are to be called upon to
make law, then, it is argued, the equity of the individual case is the
l99
indispensable and only workable direction.
This kind of judicial development of the law is generally thought to
be a rare exception and is held quite apart from the usual application of
the law. 2oo Far more common are the decisions that fill out indefinite
legal concepts discussed above. While an American looking at these
kinds of decisions would see case law at work, a German can more
readily assimilate such decisions to statutory interpretation.
Finding rules is only an intermediate step on the way to applying
rules to concrete cases and giving subjects guidance in law. The next
Subpart addresses applying law to facts.

n

LawApplying

1.

Syllogistic Law Application and Judgment Writing

The classic syllogistic law application model is the heart of law
applying in Germany.201 It has been for well over a century. The legal
rule is the major premise, the facts are the minor premise, and the
judicial decision is the logical conclusion.202 In German, carrying out the
syllogistic law application is known as Relationstechnik (relationship
technique) or Urteilstechnik (judgment technique). Here it is referred to
as judgment writing. 203 Judgment writing should not be confused with

tl> provide rules to govern the growing practice of defense/prosecution agreements in criminal
cases: "It is primarily the task of the legislature to determine the fundamental questions of the
structuring of criminal procedure." Id (author's translation) ("Es ist primlir Aufgabe des
Gesetzgebers, die grundsatzlichen Fragen der Gestaltung des Strafverfahrens ... festzulegen:').
198. Riithers, supmnote 193, at 366.
199. Josef Esser, Not und Gcfahrcn des Revisionsrechts, 17 JURISTENZElTUNG 513 (1962),
.reprinted in ZUR PROBLEMATIK DER HOCHSTRICHTERLICHEN ENTSCHEIDUNG 162, 168 (Gerd
Rollecke ed., 1982).
200. KAUFMANN, supmnote 81, at 12.
201. LARENZ, supm note 96, at 150.
202. FRIEDRICH DAUBENSPECK, REFERAT, VaruM UNO UKfEIL. EINE ANLEITUNG FOR
PRAKTISCHE JURISTEN 1M VORBEREITUNGSDIENST 1 (11th ed. 1911) ("[Das richterliche Urteil]
beruht auf einem logischen SchluJ3, dessen Obersatz die Kenntnis des Rechts, dessen Untersatz
die Kenntnis der Tartsachen bildet. Der SchluJ3satz (die Konklusion) ist der unmittelbar die
Entscheidung gebende Akt:'). This book appeared in its first edition in 1884. In 2003 it appeared
in its thirty-third edition as WINFRIED SCHUSCHKE ET AL., BERICHT, GUTACHTEN UNO UKfEIL (33d
ed. 2003). See HARTWlEG & HESSE, supm note 76, at 17 (dating the origin of Relationstechnik
between 1852 and 1884).
203. The choice of a term to translate Relationstechnik and Urteilstechnik is not easy. A
literal translation of "relation technique" would not be very meaningful. "Judgment technique"
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writing appellate opinions that detennine points of law. The key aspect
of the Relationstechnik or Urteilstechnik is the role of the judgment in
relating the facts to the law.
The classic model has been remarkably resilient. It has long been
subject to criticism. It is no longer seen by itself as a sufficient
explanation for all law application. Indeed, it is said that it no longer has
claim to being the centerpiece of law application. Yet, it dominates
instruction and practice.204 This dominance is by default. No competing
theory better describes and prescribes what Gennan judges actually do in
ordinary cases, i.e., apply law to facts. 20s Oddly, the Gennan theoretical
discussions about the difficulties of this process seem better known in the
United States than the day-to-day functioning of the judgment technique.
The fonner has received some attention in English-language literature;206
the latter, almost none. 207 While the Gennan system relies on syllogistic
law application, no reasonable jurist believes that such law application is
mechanical or always certain.
a.

Judgment Writing: Its Role in Legal Education and Its
Importance for the Legal System

Judgment writing is an essential part of every lawyer's education. It
is taught primarily in the practical training period that follows university
education in law. The ministries of justice of the several states admit the

and "judgment method" were considered, but technique is a word not used much in the American
legal vocabulary, while the word ''method'' is perhaps too widely used. "Judicial Writing" is
commonly used, but on examination, most often it is used in conjunction with opinions of
appellate courts. Hopefully "judgment writing" is sufficient to emphasize the role of the
judgment in applying the law to the facts.
204. KAUFMANN, supmnote 81, at 2-6,29-30 (reviewing recent criticisms).
205. SCHAPP, supm note 66, at 1; see also HARTwIEG & HEssE, supm note 76; PAWLOWSKI,
supra note 90, at 55; HANs-MARTIN PAWLOWSKI, METHODENLEHRE FOR JURISTEN: THEORlE DER
NORM UND DES GESETZES: EIN LEHRBUCH 205 (2d ed. 1981) ("[Man kannJ sich bei der
Rechtsanwendung in einer Reihe ,klarer' Fiille durchaus mit einer subsumierenden Auslegung
einzelner Gesetze begniigen.").
206. See. e.g., JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY ch. 5 (William Rehg trans., 1996) (Indeterminacy
of Law and the Rationality of Adjudication).
207. To the author's knowledge, until 2004, the only work was Walter O. Weyrauch, The
An ofDraliing Judgments: A Modified Gcnnan Case Method, 9 J. LEGAL EDUC. 311 (1957).
See also Christoph Engel, The Impact of Representation Noons on the Quality of Judicial
Decisions 16 (Max Planck Inst. for Research on Collective Goods, Working Paper No. 2004/13,
2004), available at http://www.mpp-rdg.mpg.delpdCdatl2004_13online.pdf; Lutz-Christian
Wolff, Structured Problem Solving: Gcnnan Methodology livm a Comparative Perspective, 14
LEGAL EDUC. REv. 19 (2003-2004), available at http://www.ler.edu.aulpdf7volumesllecvoIl4_
1_2003_04.pdf.
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students who passed the bar exam (about two-thirds) into a practical
training program that lasts about two years. While details vary from state
to state, the first year usually consists of a mixture of group course work
and apprenticeship with a particular judge. Unlike the university, where
the large lecture dominates instruction, classes are relatively small. The
teachers are judges from the COurts.208 In the university, classic syllogistic
law application is taught, but based on uncontested facts209 and not
judgment writing based on contested facts. 210
The importance of judgment writing for the German legal system as
a whole is substantial. While it is a technique of judging, it is a technique
that is taught to all German lawyers. In order to become a lawyer in
Germany, one must be qualified as a judge, and without a relatively solid
knowledge of judgment writing, one will not be· able to pass the
qualifying exam.211 This means that every German lawyer is accustomed
to applying law in this fashion. Here, only its outline will be discussed; a
more far-reaching investigation must await another day.
b.

Nature and Purpose of a Judgment

"A German judgment is supposed to appear as an act of an impartial
as well as impersonal public authority furnishing the official and
objective interpretation rather than personalized opinions of the
individual deciding justices. . . . The typical German judgment ...

208. This description is based, in part, on one such program in which the author
participated. The judge who gave the courses authored a number of books on the subject. He has
since been promoted to the Bavarian Constitutional Court.
209. Wolfgang Fi.kentscher, The Evolutionary and Cultural Origins of Heuristics That
Influence Lawmaking, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW 207,216-19 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds.,
2006) (In the university students learn the "non-litigious opinion style" and in the internship
period the "litigious opinion style" (Stil des unstreitigcn Gutachtcns and Stil des streitigen
Gutachtens, respectively). Interns learn to handle cases with varying sets of facts and subject to
different claims, objections, replications, etc. They put the many different relevant nonlitigious
opinions into one litigious opinion from which they then extract a judgment: "[TJhe judge
renders a decision, a judgment, and this decision is the litigious opiniqn turned upside down: The
decision begins with the outcome, continues with the legal rules that support the claims,
objections, rejoinders, and duplicas, etc., and ends with the subsumptions. The sequence is
presented claim by claim, objection by objection, rejoinder by rejoinder, duplica by duplica, etc.,
the whole judgment being arranged by claims. By contrast, as has been said, the nonlitigious
opinion starts with an open question (Could the plaintiff have this claim?), continues with the
subsumption, and endswith a conclusion:').
210. See Wolfgang Grunsky, Ui'rt und Unwcrt der Relationstcchnik, 1972 JURISTISCHE
SCHULUNG 29, 30 ("[D]er Referendar auf diesem Gebiet von der Universitlit so gut wie nichts
mitbringt.").
211. Cf. id
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strives after the ideal of deductive reasoning.,,212 It is designed to assure
that the parties understand the grounds for the court's decision.213 Ideally
the judgment will convince the party who loses the lawsuit that that loss
214
is the correct outcome. At a minimum, the judgment should persuade
the loser that the process was rational. Parties affected by the judgment
should be enabled rationally to reproduce the grounds for the decision.
They should recognize that rational argumentation, not arbitrariness,
determined the judgment.21S In this way, the parties are guaranteed the
constitutional right to equal treatment under the law (Article 3 of the
Basic Law) and the constitutional right to be heard (Article 103(1) of the
Basic Law).216
217
The judgment also controls the judge.
If the judge fails to
subsume the facts of the case under the applicable law properly, the
judge's decision is subject to correction on appeal. The judgment
demonstrates whether the judge understood the losing party's position;
through its impersonal and colorless nature, it demonstrates the judge's
neutrality.2lB In theory, judges should be fungible. 219
c.

Duty of Justification

The German judgment fulfills the duty of the German judge to
justify the judge's judgment. The general requirement of German law
that a decision to apply government power must be individually justified
is especially pronounced in judicial proceedings.220
Unjustified
judgments threaten the rule-of-Iaw state; justified judgments tie the
implementation of the law in the individual case to the statute. They
212. Reinhard Zimmennann, Characteristic Aspects of German Legal Culture, in
INTRoDUCTION 'TO GERMAN LAW 1, 26-27 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2005).
213. ADoLF BAUMBACH ET AL., ZIVlLPROZEIlORDNUNG § 313, margin no. 33 (58th ed.
2000).
214. KURT SCHELLHAMMER, DIE ARBEITSMETHODE DES ZMLRlCHTERS 241 (7th ed. 1984).
215. RAISCH, supra note 102, at 121.
216. BAUMBACH ET AL., supra note 213, § 313, margin no. 33.
217. SCHELLHAMMER, supra note 214, at 242.
218. EGON SCHNEIDER, DER ZIVILRECHTSFALL IN PROFuNG UND PRAxIs 178-79 (7th ed.
1988).
219. KAUFMANN, supra note 81, at 35.
220. On the constitutional basis of the duty in judicial proceedings, see JORGEN
BROGGEMANN, DIE R1CHTERLICHE BEGRONoUNGSPFLICHT:
VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHE
MINDESTANFORDERUNGEN AN DIE BEGRONoUNG GERICHTLICHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 165-79
(1971); liARTWIEG & HEsSE, supra note 76, at 154-55. Sec also DELF BUCHWALD, DER BEGRIFF
DER RATIONALEN JURlSTISCHEN BEGRONoUNG: ZUR THEORIE OER JURiDlSCHEN VERNUNFT (1990);
UWE KISCHEL, DIE BEGRONDUNG:
ZUR ERLAUTERUNG STAATLICHER ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
GEGENOBER OEM BORGER (2003); KocH & ROBMANN, supra note 194; JORG LOCKE,
BEGRONoUNGSZWANG UNO VERFASSUNG (1987).
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establish that application of the law is an impartial application of the
general rule to the specific case.221 A deductive justification is said to be
essential to the fulfillment of legal certainty.222 In the law of the
European Union, justification is not only a duty drawn from the EeJ's
general principles of legal certainty, it is also explicitly stated as an
obligation of EU institutions in the treaty establishing the European
Union. 223
The duty of justification is intended to enhance the quality of legal
decision. In the first instance, it provides a foundation to review the
decision made. 224 Just the knowledge that such a review is possible
impels decision makers to self-control.225 It requires them to base their
decisions, or at least the justifications for their decisions, on approved
reasons (e.g., the statutory requirements) and not on unapproved ones
(e.g., bias and prejudice).226 It pushes them toward more careful handling
of the materials of decision, the fact and law rIDding, and law applying.227
Particularly compared to the common-law judge, who oversees a trial as
much as reaches a decision, the duty of justification imposes on decision
makers the responsibility for the outcome of the procedure.228
d.

Elements of a Judgment

A judgment consists of a caption (Rubrum) that identifies the
parties and the lawsuit;229 a statement of the decision made and the relief
221. Paul Kirchhof,' Recht sprcchcn, Diehl Recht vcrschwcigcn: 6.ffcntlichcs Abwiigcn
und Bcgriindcn miissen im ZcntnJm dcr Rechtskultur b/cibcn, FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE
ZEITUNG, Sept. 18, 1997, at 11 ("Wenn das Gericht in seinem Urteil nicht mehr erkennbar iiber
geselzlich Vorgeschriebenes einzelfallbezogen nachdenkt, sondern nur noch den Rechtsstreit
autoritativ befriedet, verliert das Urteil seine Pragung durch das Geselz, der Richterspruch seine
Verallgemeinerungsfiihigkeit, die Justiz ihre handwerkliche Gediegenheit im unbefangenen
nachvollziehbaren Deuten der Geselzesaussage."). Kirchhof was then a Justice of the Federal
Constitutional Court. Cf. RALPH CHRISTENSEN & HANS KUDLICH, THEORIE RICHTERLICHEN
BEGRUNDENS 19 (200 1) ("Mann kann sich durchaus vorstelIen, dass der Begriindung einer
Enstscheidung im Rechtsstaat eine zentrale Bedeutung zukommt. die derjenigen des die
Entscheidung tragenden Normtextes recht nahe kommen konnte:').
222. KocH & ROBMANN, supra note 194, at 114 ("[Die] Rechtssicherheit ist damit nur bei
deduktiver Begriindungsstruktur erreichbar.").
223. ECTreaty, SlIpranote 46, art. 253.
224. Engel, supra note 207, at 16.
225. Id
226. Id at 18-19.
227. Id at 21.
228. See id at 26.
229. The caption consists of: (I) the names of the parties, of their legal representatives,
and of their attorneys; (2) the designation of the court and the names of the judges who
participated in the decision; and (3) the date of the last oral hearing. ZlVlLPROZEBORDNUNG
[ZPO] [civil procedure statute] Jan. 30, 1877, RGB/83, as amended, § 313(1), ~ 1-3.
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ordered (Tenor or Urteilsfonnei), which should be a sufficient direction
to court personnel for enforcement of the judgment;230 the findings of fact
(Tatbestand);231 and the grounds for the decision (Entscheidungs-

•• .,1;'\ 232
grunue,.

The Tatbestand, as it appears in a judgment, is a short statement of
the parties' legal claims and assertions offact.233 The ZivilprozeBordnung
(German Code of Civil Procedure) provides: "In the Tatbestand the
asserted claims and the supporting and defending materials should be
concisely presented only in their material content with particular
reference to the subject applications. For details of the subject and of the
matters in dispute, reference should be made to pleadings, minutes and
other documents."234 From the Tatbestand, it should be possible to
determine quickly who is seeking what, from whom, on what ground,
and to determine which matters are in dispute and which are not.23S The
Tatbestand serves as a public record of the oral hearing.236 It should
include: the subject matter of the lawsuit, a sketch of the facts detailed
only insofar as necessary to establish clearly the subject of the lawsuit,
the evidence offered by the parties, the applications of the parties,
relevant history of the lawsuit, and specific references to the file. It
should "not include: facts not necessary to the decision of the case, party
statements made in the proceedings that are no longer relevant, legal
arguments of the parties, statements of the law, nor normative evaluations
of the facts.2.l7 Silence in the Tatbestand is understood to prove that no
position was taken on the point. 238
230. ld § 313(1), ~ 4.
231. ld § 313(1), ~ 5. Tatbestand is difficult to translate without misleading, and so it is
left here in the original German. A standard dictionary, LANGENSCHEIDT'S NEW COLLEGE
GERMAN DICI10NARY: GERMAN-ENGLISH 525 (Heinz Messinger ed., 1973) gives the following

defmition of Tatbestand. "state of affairs; jur. facts pl of the case, constituent facts pl, factual
fmdings; objcktivcr (sulYcktivcJ)-physical (mental) element of an offence;' and it defmes
Tatbcstandsmcrkmal as an "element of an offence." .A$ noted in the text, it is used in distinctly
different ways in German legal writing. Murray and Stiimer translate it as "factual framework:'
PETER L. MURRAY & RoLF STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 334 (2004).
232. ZPO § 313(1), ~ 6.
233. ld § 313(11); SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 186. It has another meaning as the major
premise of a rule.
234. ZPO § 3l3(1I) (author's translation) ("1m Tatbestand sollen die erhobenen Anspruche
und die dazu vorgebrachten Angriffs- und Verteidigungsmittel unter Hervorhebung der gestellten
Antriige nur ihrem wesentlichen Inhalt nach knapp dargestellt werden. Wegen der Einzelheiten
des Sach- und Streitstandes solI auf Schriftslitze, Protokolle und andere UnterIagen verwiesen
werden:').
235. SCHNEIDER, supmnote 218, at 185.
236. ZPO § 314.
237. GONTHER SCHMm ET AL., DIE STATION IN ZNILSACHEN 90 (6th ed. 2002).
238. ld at 89.
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The grounds for the decision justify the relief ordered or other
resolution of the case.239 Matters not relevant to the decision made or the
relief ordered do not belong in the grounds for the decision. 240 The
grounds for decision are to evaluate and subsume the concrete facts of
the Tatbestandunder the abstract elements of the applicable rule.24 I The
German Code of Civil Procedure provides: ''The grounds for decision
contain a short summary of the consideration on which the decision in
factual and legal respects rests.,,242 In the normal case it should include
the following:
A statement of the result and the claims for relief;
A statement that the complaint states a cause of action (is schliissig);
A statement that the claim is permissible, i.e., satisfies the
prerequisites for a lawsuit (e.g., the court has subject matter and personal
jurisdiction) (is zuJiissi!iJ;
A statement of the facts that satisfy the abstract elements of the
applicable rule;
A statement justifying the factual fmdings necessary for application
of the law; and
A statement of which facts are undisputed and which are disputed
and an evaluation of the evidence and resolution of the issue with respect to
disputed facts relevant to the decision.243

The law application is normally carried through as follows. First,
the grounds for the decision state the conclusion and the applicable rule.
Then, for each element of the Tatbestand of the applicable rule. insofar as
necessary. the grounds for decision clarify the legal defmition of the
element as it relates to the particular case. This is the place for statutory
interpretation, but only to the extent directly relevant to determining
whether the facts in the present case fulfill the requirements of the
statutory Tatbestand Purely abstract discussions of law have no place in
the judgment. Once the legal requirement is clarified, the grounds for
decision are to subsume the specific facts found under the identified and
clarified rule. 244

239. PETER SIEGBURG,EINFOHRUNG IN DlEURTEILSTECHNlK 182 (5thed. 2003).
240. ScHMITZ ET AL., supmnote 237, at 98.

241. Id
242. ZPO § 313(III) (author's translation) ("Die Entscheidungsgriinde enthalten eine kurze
Zusammenfassung der Erwagungen, auf denen die Entscheidung in tatsachlicher und rechtlicher
Hinsicht beruht.").
243. This is a distillation of the matters dealt with in over a dozen variations of the
judgment in ScHMITZ ET AL., supm note 237, at 100-02 (author's translation).

244. Id
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Insofar as necessary, the grounds for decision are to clarify the facts
relied upon in the application of the rules. No mention of undisputed
facts is necessary. The grounds for decision should identify the obvious
and conceded facts that it treats as undisputed. For those facts that are
disputed, the grounds for decision should evaluate the evidence leading
to the findings made. Only if a fact necessary for the judgment remains
unproven should the grounds for decision discuss the burden of proof. 245
German experience in teaching judgment writing shows that
students have great difficulty learning to evaluate evidence.246 Americans
who know this and realize that these "students" are highly educated, have
all completed four or more years of law school, and have passed the first
state bar examination, may question the validity of the premise of the
American jury system and of the American system generally that
"assessment of evidence involves no special expertise.,,247
e.

Applying the Rule: "Back-and-Forth" in Rule Application

Applying the rule as noted ideally proceeds as a syllogism. The
major premise is the Tatbestand of the rule. As used with respect to the
rule, Tatbestand means the legal prerequisites for the application of the
legal rule. It consists of one or more elements. When all the elements of
the Tatbestand are present, then there is a legal consequence. Whether
the facts in a particular case fulfill the Tatbestand of the rule is the minor
premise. When it does, the rule applies. Thus, that decision is the core
of the process.248
No longer is it believed that the rule can simply be read from the
statute. Instead, it is usually necessary to search the statute for the rules,
to compare the rules to the facts, to revisit the statute in light of the facts,
and to examine the facts again in light of the rules. This process of going
back and forth was identified in the first part of the twentieth century and
249
has since assumed a place in the description of law application.
Americans who are familiar with the attention the German system gives
245. Id
246. Id at 103 ("Bei der Erstelhmg der Urteilsentwiirfe, die der Referendar in aller Regel
schon k:urz nach Beginn seiner Ausbildung zu fertigen hat, bereitet erfahrungsgemiif3 die
Beweiswiirdigung grol3e Schwierigkeiten:').
247. GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CML PROCEDURE: AN
INTRODUCTION 81 (1993) ("[T]he American system rests on the premise that assessment of
evidence involves no special expertise.").
248. HARTWIEG & HESSE, supra note 76 (Kemstiick); sec also PAWLOWSKI, supra note 90,
at 57 ("Unter Subsumption im engeren Sinne versteht man die Verbindung eines Satzes mit
einem individuellen (Urteils-) Sachverhalt.").
249. Sec HARTWIEG & HESSE, supra note 76, at 78-79 (Die Lehrc vom Pcndelblick).
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to teaching and exercising the application of law to facts will not be
inclined to deprecate the task that can be handled by "mere law
appliers."2so
f.

Decisions Against Law and Discretion

Article 20(3) of the Basic Law provides that the judiciary is bound
by "statute and justice."2S1 Accordingly, a judgment may not be against
the law.2S2 The German legal system approach of an abstract order
applied to individual cases seeks to eliminate all but preprogrammed
departures from stated legal rules.2S3 Rather than permit judges or
administrators to depart ad hoc from legal rules, the German ideal is to
write the rule in a way that provides for a valuing by the judge or
administrator in the individual case. In other words, the rule is to grant a
bounded discretion to the judge to make a decision. That decision may
be based either on the claims of justice or the needs of public policy in
the particular case. When the decision is founded on interests of public
policy, it should be subject to political control.
2.

Applying Law in Practice-Preparing for and Reviewing the
Judgmenf54

The goal of German civil procedure is a rationally justified
judgmenf55 that is correct as a matter of substantive law. 256 To reach that
goal requires determination of facts, detennination of law, and
application of the law to the facts found. The goal reflects that a
fundamental function of German civil procedure is a vindication of
individual rights. 257

250. Quoting JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF
DEMOCRACY 247 (1994) ("The typical handbook warns the jury to leave the law to the judge, to
accept the judge's instructions on the law whether they agree with them or not. What is left for
the jury to do? ... There is no room left for jurors to function openly as the conscience of the
community ....").
251. GG art. 20(3).
252. KocH & ROBMANN, supra note 194, at 255; see supra text accompanying notes 189194.
253. SeeMAxEINER, supra note 71, at 10-14.
254. While syllogistic law applying applies throughout German law, methods vary among
civil, criminal, administrative, and other procedures. This study limits its discussion to civil
procedure.
255. See CHRISTENSEN & KUDLICH, supra note 221, at 80-82.
256. MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 153.

257. Id
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German civil litigation is properly described as adversarial in that
the parties control the scope and general conduct of the proceedings. 2S8
But it does not provide for adversarial presentation or discovery of facts.
While German civil procedure guarantees a right to be heard, it does not
guarantee a day in court to present whatever legal or factual theory a
party might wish to present. While the parties have the responsibility for
presenting the facts, the judge is responsible for knowing the law. 259 The
parties may suggest legal grounds, but in the end, the maxim cia miN
factum, clabo ubi ius (give me the facts, I will give you the law) applies.
The role of the judge is decidedly different than that of the referee in
American litigation. Where in American litigation the judges oversee
how the parties present their cases, in German litigation the parties
oversee how the court conducts and decides cases.260
German civil procedure does not encourage parties to make new
law or to argue facts in novel ways. Making new law through litigation is
not one of its principal purposes.261 The automatic award of costs and
attorney's fees to the prevailing party makes the litigation risk of trying
something new considerably greater than in the United States. In view of
the greater role of the judge in conducting proceedings, the parties are
more dependent on the patience of the judge in entertaining novel
arguments. Moreover, it is in the interest of busy judges to conclude
proceedings as quickly as possible. And, because the ultimate decision is
made by the judge and not by a separate decision maker, i.e., not by a
jury, trying the judge's patience runs greater risks than in the United
States, where the ultimate decision is made by an independent jury.
a.

The Judgment: The Goal of Civil Procedure

German civil procedure is directed toward reaching a judgment.
This keeps the proceedings focused on the application of existing legal
rules to the facts of the instant case. At the end of the day, what
legitimates the outcome is a rational judgment rather than the
presentations in court. The individual elements required by statute to
establish a claim are the "spectacles" through which judges view cases.
What can be seen through the spectacles matters; everything else is
258. Id at 152.
259. See 0niMAR JAUERNlG, ZIVlLPROZESSRECHT § 25(V) (20th ed. 1983); LEO
ROSENBERG & KARL HEINz SCHWAB, ZIVILPROZESSRECHT §§ 78-79 (13th ed. 1981).
260. See,
e.g., FRANZ-JOSEF RINSCHE, PRoZESSTAKTlK:
SACHGERECHTE
VERFAHRENSFOHRUNG DES REcHTSANWALTS 63 (1987) (noting that when the judge takes minutes
of witnesses' testimony-there is no verbatim transcript--the lawyer must "control" the process
to make sure the minutes do not lose nuances that may not fit the judges' preconceptions).
261. MURRAY &STORNER, supra note 231, at 153.
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irrelevant. 262 Freed from the need to entertain either party presenting a
story, the judge can focus on the material points in dispute to find just
those facts necessary for the decision. 263 From the beginning to the end
of the process, the rules of procedure focus the parties and the court on
determining the facts necessary to fulfill the requirements of the
applicable rule.
b.

Prehearing

Complaint The plaintiff takes the fIrSt step toward commencing a
lawsuit by filing a complaint with the court. Only after the court
conducts a preliminary review of the complaint for the procedural
prerequisites of a lawsuit, and only after the court serves the complaint,
does a lawsuit actually begin. Among other matters, the complaint must
include "the precise description of the subject matter and of the basis of
the asserted claim."264 Notice pleading, as known in the United States, is
not known in Germany. The complaint must include all facts on which
the claim rests, not merely what the claim is.265 Moreover, it must state
the means of proof that are to prove the factual assertions, i.e., the
complaint must be "substantiated."z66 Relevant documents in possession
of the plaintiff are appended to the complaint. Documents in the
possession of others as well as expected witness testimony are indicated
by designation. 267 The substantiation must be such that the complaint
states the facts so exactly that, based on the information provided, the
court could determine that the claimed legal relief should be granted.
The degree of substantiation for each fact asserted varies. When a fact is
not seriously disputed, it can be stated in general terms. When it is
disputed, it must be substantiated precisely. Proffering too little support

262. JOACHIM HRUSCHKA, DIE KoNSTITUTION DES RECHTSFALLES:
VERHALTNIS VON TATSACHENFESTSTELLUNG UND RECHTSANWENDUNG 22-24

SmOlEN ZUM
(1965) ("Der
Urteiler mul3 wissen, was er wissen will. . .. Die Tatbestiinde ... sind gewissermafien die Brille,
durch die der Richter im weiteren Verlauf der Verhandlung alles betrachtet. Was durch diese
Brille nicht gesehen werden kann, ist fUr den Urteiler irrelevant.").
263. Sec John H. Langbein, The Gennan AdJl8l1tage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv.
823,830 (1985) ("[T]he court ranges over the entire case, constantly looking for the jugular-for
the issue of law or fact that might dispose of the case:').
264. ZPO § 253(11), '\12 (author's translation) ("[D]ie bestimmte Angabe des Gegenstandes
und des Grundes des erhobenen Anspruchs.").
265. MURRAY &STORNER, supmnote 231, at 197-98.
266. This is a general requirement for all so-called preparatory submissions generally. ZPO
§ 130. It applies to complaints through German Code of Civil Procedure section 253(IV).
267. MURRAY & STORNER, supmnote 231, at 197-98.
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in the initial complaint is ordinarily not fatal, but good practice is to err
by substantiating too much rather than too little.268
Subject Matter of the Controversy. Through its statement of the
claim, the complaint determines the scope of the controversy.269 The
learning surrounding the subject matter of the controversy is said to be
the very basis of modern civil procedure. 270 The principle of party control
of the proceedings means that the court cannot go beyond the claims
asserted (except as the defendant may appropriately raise additional
claims). On the other hand, while the facts as stated by the plaintiff
should suggest a particular legal basis for the claim, the court is not
bound by such suggestions.271 Indeed, the court is required to consider all
possible legal bases for a claim relating to the facts alleged in the
complaint.
Review of Complaint for Pennissibility. Before the court is
permitted to issue a judgment, it is required to determine that all
procedural prerequisites are satisfied. This is called a "test of the claim
for permissibility." Procedural prerequisites are those circumstances the
presence (or absence) of which are required in order for a lawsuit to be
proper. Examples are personal and subject matter jurisdiction.272
Because any work done on a case in which these requirements are not
met is wasted, from the earliest moment-and throughout the case--it is
the duty of the judge to review the judge's own decision of whether the
procedural prerequisites have been met. 273 Ordinarily, the court conducts
such an initial review even before directing service of the complaint.
Should the court have concerns about whether the procedural
prerequisites are met, the court is to direct the party concerned to clarify
the point. 274
268. RINSCHE, supra note 260, at 37. Rinsche gives an example of when one can plead in
general terms and when not: one can plead generally that the parties had a contract, if the
agreement is not in dispute. But if the other party disputes whether the parties reached a contract,
then the complaint should describe its conclusion in detail. Id
269. GRUNSKY, supra note 168, at 26; MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 156-57.
270. SCHNEIDER, supra note 218, at 266 (noting also that the "Streitgegenstand' is one of
the most disputed aspects of German civil procedure); see HEINZ THOMAS & HANs PUTZO,
Z£VILPROZEBoRDNUNG EINLEITUNG II, 5·10 (27th ed. 2005) (this section by Klaus Reichold).
271. EOON SCHNEIDER, DIE KLAGE (2d ed. 2004).
272. Procedural prerequisites are both general (required for all cases) and specific
(required only for certain types of cases). They may be positive (those that must be present) or
negative (those that must not be present). Related but different are the requirements on whether
the parties and their representatives may act in the case, i.e., Prozesshandlungsvoraussetzungen.
SCHMITZ ET AL., supra note 237, at 12.
273. THOMAS & PuTZo, supra note 270, § 253 Vorbem, margin no. 8, at 378.
274. MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 210; THOMAS & Purzo, supra note 270,
§ 253 Vorbem, margin nos. 12·13, at 379. The defendant may also challenge in the answer
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The procedural prerequisites of German civil procedure are largely
familiar to American lawyers. Five correspond to requirements of the
U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), nos. (1) to (5):
(1) subject matter jurisdiction, (2) personal jurisdiction, (3) venue,
(4) process, and (5) service of process.27S However, German civil
procedure handles these issues differently than the American system. In
American federal civil procedure, these issues are reviewed--ordinarily
only upon a party's initial response to service of a complaint-if the
defendant requests such a review. In that case, the court, after possibly
taking testimony, determines whether the challenged prerequisite is
absent. In German civil procedure, on the other hand, the judge checks
whether the procedural perquisites are all present at the outset of the
case.
Prehearing Measures. Once the complaint is served, the defendant
is required to respond with an answer. The answer is subject to
requirements similar to those governing the complaint: it must be true,
complete, specific, and substantiated.276 Even before the defendant
responds to the complaint, the court determines, based on the nature of
the case and the court's own preferences, whether the case will go
directly to a so-called early .frrst hearing or frrst follow written
procedures.277 In either case, prior to the frrst hearing, the court is
required to make preparations for the hearing, which may include:
(1) directing the parties to supplement their pleadings, (2) directing
government authorities to provide information and documents,
(3) ordering the personal appearance of the parties, (4) summoning
witnesses named by a party to the hearing, and (5) ordering the
production of documents or things and making premises and other things
available for observation.278
c.

Clarifying Issues in Oral Hearings

German court hearings resemble American pretrial conferences
. more than American trials. They are serious, rather than ceremonial.279 It

whether procedural prerequisites are present. See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 23132.
275. FED. R. av. p. 12(b).
276. See ZPO § 277; MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 230.
277. See ZPO §§ 272,275-276.
278. ZPO §§ 142, 144,273.
279. See Langbein, supra note 263, at 831 ("German civil proceedings have the tone not of
the theatre, but of a routine business meeting--serious rather than tense."); Edson R. Sunderland,
Book Review, 15 A.B.AJ. 35, 35 (1929) (quoting Pierre LePaulle, who expressed "his
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is in this atmosphere that judge and counsel and, often, parties meet for
the frrst time. The focus of the meeting is on providing the judge with
what the judge needs to write a judgment. It is not, as it might be in an
American pretrial conference, focused on preparations for presentation of
the parties' stories at a later date. The judge conducts and controls the
hearing. 28O While the court is in charge, however, the court can work with
only that which the parties provide.281
Before taking any evidence, the court is required to discuss the case
thoroughly with the parties.282 American lawyers would fmd such
discussions very informal. The German Code of Civil Procedure
requires that the parties participate fully in this discussion. Section 138
provides:
1. The parties are to give their declarations concerning factual
circumstances completely and truthfully.
2. Each party must declare its position with respect to the facts
asserted by its opponent.
3. Facts which are not expressly contested are to be treated as
admitted, unless the intention to contest them appears from the
parties declarations.
4. A declaration of lack of knowledge is allowable only with
respect to facts which were neither the party's own action nor
the subject of its own observations. 283
In the course of the hearing, the judge discusses with the parties and their
counsel their positions on the facts on which the judge will base the
judgment. These discussions are not evidentiary. They do notconstitute
taking testimony of the parties. They amount to clarification of the
factual assertions of the parties that are necessary for the eventual
application of the rule to the facts.284
The court's discussion of the facts can obviate the need to take
evidence in whole or in part. In the course of the hearing or in the
pleadings, should one party admit a fact asserted by the other, there is no

amazement at the ineffective manner in which justice is administered ... more like a high church
ceremony than a business transaction").
280. MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 256-59.
281. Id at 253.
282. The 2002 amendments provide that the court is fIrst to discuss the possibility of
settlement.
283. ZPO § 138, tnmslatedinMuRRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 159-60.
284. SCHMITZ ET AL., supra note 237, at 31 ("Kliirung des fi1r die Nonnsubsumtion
benotigen Tatsachenvortrages der Parteien, soweit dazu noch Veranlassung besteht.").
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need to prove the face 8s Moreover, under section 138(3) of the German
Code of Civil Procedure, an asserted fact will be treated as admitted if
the other party is silent and fails to contest ies6 Under section 138(4),
only in limited circumstances can a declaration of lack of knowledge
serve to put a matter in dispute. 287 Moreover, section 138(2) is interpreted
to require that a mere denial of fact is not sufficient to put it in dispute.
As a general rule, a party must explicitly contest the fact asserted, and if
the fact asserted is known or could be known to the party, then the party
must substantiate its contrary contention with facts known to ie88
It is incorrect to liken these hearings either to trial or to discovery.289
Their focus is on identifying fact issues; it is not on uncovering unknown
facts nor on proving known ones. The parties' submissions have
suggested which statutes are to provide the directions for writing the
judgment. The hearings are to identify those material facts and, to the
extent possible, bring the parties to agree on them. Evidence to prove
those facts is taken only if there is disagreement among the parties with
respect to material facts. 290 By American measures, the proceedings are
highly interactive, comparatively cooperative, and very informal. 291
d.

The Right To Be Heard

Article 103(1) of the Basic Law guarantees parties the right to be
heard.292 It requires that the court not decide a case without giving the
parties an opportunity to express their views on the issues of law and
fact. Among the provisions of the German Code of Civil Procedure that
are designed to assure this right, section 139 has a particularly important
role. The court has a duty to clarify the parties' positions in terms of the
court's intended basis for the decision:
1.

The court is to discuss with the parties the relevant facts and
issues in dispute from a factual and legal perspective to the
extent reasonable and to raise questions. It is to cause the
parties timely and completely to declare their positions

285. ZPO § 288, '\II.
286. Id § 138, '\13.
287. Id § 138, '\14.
288. SCHMITZ ET AL., supra note 237, at 31.
289. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better
~y':' Litigation Altematives, and Accommodation: Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824,
854n.l09.
290. MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 257 n.33.
291. Murray and Stiimer describe them at some length. Id at 256-59. It is hard to know
what to liken them to in American experience: group work on a crossword puzzle?
292. GO art. 103( 1).
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concerning all material facts, especially to supplement
insufficient references to the relevant facts, to designate the
means of proof and to set forth claims based on the facts
asserted.
The court may base its decision on a claim, other than a minor
or auxiliary claim, on a point of fact or law which a party has
apparently overlooked or considered insignificant only if the
court has called the parties' attention to the point and given
opportunity for comment on it. The same provision applies if
the court's understanding of a point of fact or law differs from
the understanding of both parties.
The court is to call attention to the court's inclinations which
exist with respect to those points which may be noticed on the
court's own motion.
Hints and feedback according to this requirement are to be
communicated and documented in the record as early as
possible. Their rendition can be proven only through the
content of the record. Only evidence of forgery of the record
can be received to contradict its contents.
If a party is not prepared to respond immediately to a judicial
request for clarification the court on the motion of the party
may set a time limit for further clarification by written
argument. 293

This kind of clarification is hardly conceivable unless the court and
the parties have a good idea what the applicable legal rule is and what its
elements are.
German Code of Civil Procedure section 139(2)
recognizes this explicitly when it requires that the court call to the
parties' attention any legal norm it intends to apply.294
American pretrial proceedings are not without their analogues to
these kinds of discussions. Some pretrial conferences engage in these
kinds of discussion. Given the focus on each side preparing for its day in
court, one could expect that a judge who pushed too hard would be faced
with the objection that the judge was usurping the party's right to tell its
story. The pretrial discovery mechanisms-particularly the requests to
admit, but also written interrogatories and depositions-are intended to
permit the same kind of issue narrowing. Without the coercive presence
of the judge, and the judge's focus on formulating a judgment rather than
presenting a case, they are rarely able to achieve the intended effect.
293. ZPO § 139, translated in MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 167-68.
294. Id § 139(2).
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Instead, one party endeavors mightily to ask many and wide-ranging
questions, while the other party endeavors just as mightily to formulate
responses in such a narrow fashion as to be nearly useless.
e.

Taking of Evidence

Taking of evidence occurs only if ordered by the court upon request
ofa party.295 The order of the court is to include identification of the fact
in dispute; identification of the means of proof, including the names of
witness and experts; and identification of the party seeking the proof.296
The court is to order the taking of evidence only when necessary to
convince the court of the truth or untruth of a particular fact that is
disputed by the parties and is material to the court's decision of the
case.291 Thus, there is no need to prove: undisputed facts,298 facts
generally known to the court/99 facts presumed by statute until the
contrary is proven/oo favorable facts established by the other party's
submissions, disputed main facts established by undisputed facts,
disputed facts the truth of which the court is convinced without taking
evidence, and facts not necessary for the judgment (e.g., two alternatives
for granting relief are allowed and one is already acknowledged).JOI
According to German judge.s with whom I have spoken, the majority of
cases are concluded (by settlement or judgment) without witnesses ever
being heard.
f.

Review of Judgments-Appeals on Facts and Law

The recent reform of German civil procedure introduced a
completely "new conception"J02 of the first appeal. Previously, the first
appeal anticipated a trial de novo; virtually everything was done anew. J03
The formal parliamentary justification for the reform bill rejected this
long-used approach both as uneconomical and as not required by the

295. See ZPO §§ 283, 358. In civil cases, the court does not have authority to call
witnesses who have not been nominated by a party. MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 231, at 264.
296. ZPO § 359.
297. ScHMITZET AL., s~ranote 237, at 32.
298. ZPO §§ l38,288.
299. Id § 291.
300. Cf. id § 292.
301. ScHMITZ ET AL., supra note 237, at 32.
302. LUDWIG KROIB, DAS NEUE ZIVILPROZEBRECHT 55 (2001).
303. This was stated explicitly in the old version of ZPO § 525. Sec MURRAY & STORNER,
supra note 231, at 373.
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rule-of-Iaw state.304 According to the justification, the function of review
now is "to review the judgment of the first instance for its application of
the substantive law as well as the correctness and completeness of the
determinations reached and to correct any mistakes.,,30S Under the new
law, the appellate court is required to accept factual fmdings of the court
of frrst instance "insofar as there is no clear indication of doubt of the
correctness or completeness of the fact determinations material to the
decision and therefore indication for a new fact determination.,,306 If
there is such doubt, however, the court, as before, may take new
testimony and find new facts.307
Whether the reform will materially change the scope of review
remains to be seen, but most commentators think: that it will noe08 What
remains the same after the reform is the appellate court's responsibility
for the material correctness of the ftnal judgment. The appellate court is
not to search for error by the court below, but rather is to insure that the
judgment is correct and, if it is not, to reach the correct judgment itself.
Now, however, rather than to conduct the proceedings of the case itself,
the court is to review the trial court's factual fmdings for correctness and
to apply the law to the facts as found. By focusing on how the trial court
applied the law, these reforms may enhance legal certainty. In any case,
other aspects of the reform seek to enhance legal certainty by helping the
winner conclude the case sooner. The court is required to review all
appeals when initially ftled. It is to dismiss, ex officio, any appeal that,
according to all the members of the court, appears to have no chance of
success, raises no legal issue of fundamental importance, imposes a
decision for the sake of the development of the law, or requires a uniform
interpretation of the law.309
Legal certainty does not always result even when legal decisions are
made according to laws that are well-drafted and easily found. Even
then, there may be substantial legal indeterminacy that results from
governmental structures. American jurists accept with resignation that a
necessary product of federalism is substantial legal uncertainty. Yet
304. BTDrucks 14/4722, at 64-65, reprinted in RoLF HANNICH ET AL., ZPO-REFORM:
314 (2002).
305. ld (author's translation) ("Funktion der Berufung wird es kiinftig sein, das

ErNFOHRUNG-TEXTE-MATERIALIEN

erstinstanzliche Urteil auf die korrekte Anwendung des materiellen Rechts sowie auf Richtigkeit
und Vollstandigkeit der getroffenen Feststellungen bin zu iiberpriifen und etwaige Fehler zu
beseitigen.").
306. ZPO § 529(1), ~ I, translated in MURRAY & STURNER, SUpl7l note 231, at 373.
307. Sec id § 529(1), ~ 2.
308. MURRAY & STORNER, SUpl7l note 231, at 382-83.
309. SecZPO § 529(11).
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Germany is a federal state where federalism has not undermined the
guidance function of the rule of law. The following section considers
why.

E

Rule Conflict and Rule Coordination in European Federalism

In the United States, federalism is seen to come .at the cost of legal
certainty.310 Although Germany is a federal state within a still larger
federal European Union, federalism is not seen as seriously reducing
legal certainty. Only last year, Germany completed a major overhaul of
its federal structures without legal uncertainty ever being seen as a part
or a problem of those structures.
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, differences among the
German states were considerably greater than they were among the
American states.311 Germany consisted of dozens of independent
sovereigns-kingdoms, duchies, and principalities. Laws were anything
but uniform. The three most important states, Austria, Bavaria, and
Prussia, had already codified their civil law. Other states applied the
French civil code, originally imposed upon them by Napoleon. Still
other states had their own peculiar laws. Upon the defeat of Napoleon,
Professor Anton Thibaut of the University of Heidelberg called for the
adoption of a single civil code for all of Germany.312 Professor Friedrich
Carl von Savigny of the University of Berlin, and later Minister of Justice
of Prussia, opposed a civil code.313 He argued that the time was not yet
ripe. 314 While no code was adopted then, German unification, first in the
form of the North German Customs Union in 1866, and then in the form
of a federal state in 1871, led to the adoption of codes.3IS
At the end of the nineteenth century, on January 1, 1900, a civil
code for a united Germany (less Austria) entered into force (Biirgerliches
Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code».3\6 It replaced dozens of different
legal regimes.317 Above all, it brought a uniform law for all of Germany

310. Maxeiner, supm note 10, at 576.
311. Excepting only slavery.
312. A.F.J. THIBAUT, UEBER DlE NOTHWENDIGKEIT EINES ALLGEMEINEN BURGERLICHEN
RECHTS FOR DEUTSCHLAND (1814), reprinted in THIBAUT UND SAVIGNY:
lHRE
PROGRAMMATISCHEN ScHRIFTEN 37-59 (Hans Hattenhauer ed., 2002).
313. FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY, OF THE VOCATION OF OUR AGE FOR LEGISLATION AND
JURISPRUDENCE (Abraham Hayward trans., 1831).
314. Id
-.J
315. Frederic William Maitland, The Making of the Gcnnan Civil Code, in 3 THE
COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WIlLIAM MAITLAND 474 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 1911).
316. BGB.
317. For a list, see MONCHENER KoMMENTAR, supm note 114, at 8-11.
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except Austria.318 It proved to be a spectacular success. Across the
English Channel, noted legal historian Frederic William Maitland, gave
praise: "[The German] has codified the greater part and the most
important part of his law; he has set his legal house in order; he has swept
away the rubbish into the dustbin; he has striven to make his legal system
rational, coherent, modem, worthy of his country and our century."319
The German Civil Code's underlying social thinking reflected the world
of the nineteenth century. Recently refreshed in 2002 through significant
revisions, it promises to govern Germany well into the twenty-first
century until such time as it is replaced by a civil code for all of Europe.
The continued success of the German Civil Code is in large
measure due to the exceptionally strong jurisprudential foundation on
which it rests (the PandektenwissenschaR). Its adoption, however, was
due to the forces that brought about national unity. Codification came
from the top down. When national unity was achieved in 1871, a newly
united Germany turned almost immediately to codifying its laws on a
national basis. In 1873, the German legislature amended the constitution
to give the federal government competence over its civillaw. 320 While it
was not until 1896 that the legislature agreed on the new civil code, in the
meantime it adopted national codes of civil procedure, criminal law,
criminal procedure, and commercial law. 321
The Basic Law of 1949 as amended through 2006 sets out
contemporary Germany's federal structure. It parallels the United States
Constitution in allowing for divided law-making competencies. The
federal government is a government of limited powers. Except as
provided by the Basic Law, the exercise of government powers and the
right to legislate are matters for the states.322 Where the federal
government is competent, its laws are supreme.323 The Basic Law again
parallels the United States Constitution in the powers it assigns to the
federal government. Among parallel powers are: foreign affairs and
defense, citizenship, currency, weights and measures, commerce and

318. Maitland, supm note 315, at 476-77 (noting that "ever since the sixteenth century, the
main force which has made for codification has been a desire for uniform national law" after
observing the presence of this "special reason" in Germany).
319. ld at 476. Ironically, Maitland's address was published in the very month in which
Roscoe Pound gave his famous address The Causes of Popular DissatisfiJction with the
Administration of Justice, 29 A.BA. REp. 395, 417 (1906), which echoes some of Maitland's
remarks.
320. 1 MONcHENER KoMMENTAR, supmnote 114, at 7.

321. ld
322. GG arts. 30, 70.
323. ld art. 31.
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navigation, postal services and roads, intellectual property rights, and the
anned forces. 324
In Germany, unlike in the United States, questions of state
competence for legislation and of applicability to particular cases do not
entangle the courts and do not materially undermine legal certainty.32S
The German legal system uses a number of devices that contribute to
safeguarding legal certainty notwithstanding the divided law-making
competencies.
Where the United States Constitution has little to say about how
federal powers are to be shared with the states, the German Basic Law
says much. In granting the federal government powers, it catalogues
exclusive powers326 separately from those powers exercised concurrently
with the states.327 It defmes what exclusive328 and what concurrent
mean.329 It provides mechanisms for cooperation among the federal and
state governments.330 The guiding idea of legal certainty is that conflicts
between competencies between federal and state governments should not
create conflicts of law in law application.331
The Basic Law helps minimize conflicts between state and federal
legislation by providing for direct participation of the states in federal
legislation that affects them.
The Bundesrat is composed of
representatives of the states. These representatives are not elected by the
people, but are appointed by the state governments. Most legislation
requires the consent of the Bundesrae32
Another way that the Basic Law works to minimize the effect of
diverse competencies for legislation and to enhance legal certainty is by
making sure that most constitutional issues of competency are decided
promptly upon adoption of applicable law. If there are doubts about the
compatibility of federal or state law with the Basic Law, the Federal
Constitutional Court is to decide the issue upon application of the federal
324. Id arts. 32, 73 (additional provision regarding foreign relations); id art. 87a (anned
forces).
325. Cf.Maxeiner, supra note 10, at 577-80.
326. GG art. 73.
327. Id arts. 74, 74a.
328. Id art. 71.
329. Id art. 72.
330. Id arts. 91a-b.
331. ScHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 119 ("Konkurrierende Gesetzgebung bedeutet ja nicht
eine Konkurrenz von Bundesund Landesrecht, sondem nur eine Konkurrenz der
Gesetzgebungszustiindigkeit:').
332. GG arts. 77-78; see DAVID P. CuRRIE, THE CONS1111JTION OF THE FEDERAL REpUBLIC
OF GERMANY 61-63 (1994); REINHOLD ZIPPELIUS, DEUTSCHES STAATSRECHT: EIN STUDIENBUCH
§ 16, at 114 (29th ed. 1994).
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government, of a state government, or of one-third of the members of the
Bundestag. 333 There is no case or controversy requirement for what is
referred to as "abstract review.,,)34 As a practical matter, constitutional
issues related to competency for law making usually are decided before a
statute ever takes effect. Should issues arise subsequent to legislation
taking effect, the Federal Constitutional Court alone is competent to
decide to put a statute out of force. Affected parties may petition the
Federal Constitutional Court directly or, if a serious issue arises in the
course of ordinary litigation, the lower court concerned is to refer the
issue to the Federal Constitutional Court.33S Abstract review and
centralization of decisions makes consideration of issues such as federal
preemption in ordinary lawsuits and promotion of legal certainty
unnecessary.336
These constitutional provisions do not, however, exhaust the devices
by which the Gennan legal system safeguards legal certainty in
managing federal and state relations. In Gennan understanding, "the
unity of law" interest demands that the competencies and nonns of the
federal and state governments should mutually support each other. Taken
together, they should create an order free of contradictory commands.337
This means not only that competencies for legislation be clear
beforehand, but also that choice of law among federal legislation and that
of the various states should not substantially reduce legal certainty.
The national codes (civil code, criminal code, civil procedure,
criminal procedure, administrative law, and administrative procedure)
and various important federal statutes are the principal Gennan laws.
Notwithstanding substantial state competencies to legislate, most
important German laws are federa1. 338 Subjects of the law and decision
makers tum Irrst to the federal law for most questions. While the Basic
Law does not mandate the national codes' preeminence, it does promote
333. GG art. 93(1), ~ 2.
334. See Alec Stone Sweet, Why Europt! RejectedAmerican Judicial Review: And W1v'It
May Not Matter, 101 MICH. L. REv. 2744,2770 (2003).
335. Id
336. See WOLFGANG MARz, BUNDESRECHT BRlCHT LANDESRECHT: EINE SfAAfSRECHTLICHE
UNfERSUCHUNG ZU ARTIKEL 31 DES GRUNDGESETZES 108-12, 204 (1989) (noting that Basic Law
Article 31 is largely superfluous when the competency rules of Articles 70 et seq. are followed);
see also SCHNEIDER, supra note 87, at 118-24; Council of Europe, Venice Comm'n, The European
Model of Constitution.al Review ofLegislation, at Ad C, Doc. No. CDL-JU(2006)016 (Mar. 24,
2006) (prepared by Jan Mazak), available at http://www.venice.coe.intldocsl2006/CDLJU(2006)016-e.asp (noting that concentrated judicial review provides "the assurance of legal
certainty" and "[t]he abstract character of judicial review is also linked to the principle of legal
certainty").
337. ZIPPELlUS, supra note 332, § 16, at 114.
338. CURRIE, supra note 332, at 61.
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harmonized state legislation by granting the federal government the
power to adopt framework laws that set out general principles regarding
state government civil service, higher education, the press, nature
conservation, regional planning, and civil registration.339 Historically, the
state governments have worked closely together in preparation of model
statutes and decisions to adopt legislation. 340 State competency for
legislation has been impacted less by federal legislation than by
legislation of the European Union, which often addresses issues assigned
to the states.341
Yet another way that the Basic Law protects legal certainty is to
foreclose purely local legislation. While it guarantees local governments
the right to administer their own affairs as provided by statute,342 it does
not extend to them any competency for legislation of their own.343
The German form of federalism thus contributes to legal certainty
rather than undermine it. In matters in which a single national law
governs, there is no competition among the laws of different states or
between state and federal law, and there can be no inconsistencies. In
areas where state law applies, there ordinarily is no conflict with federal
law, because those issues have been decided already. Conflicts among
laws of different states or between state and federal government, such as
there are, do not seem to significantly undermine legal certainty.
The success of the German federalism in promoting legal certainty
is palpable. The constitutional provision that provides that federal law
preempts state law, Article 31 of the Basic Law, fmds little application;
the vast majority of cases avoid a conflict through preventive allocation
of competencies.344 In 2006, Germany made the most extensive revisions
to the Basic Law to date in what was referred to as the "Federalism
Reform." In anticipation of that reform, a blue ribbon panel composed of
members of both houses of parliament, the government, the state
legislatures, associations of municipalities, and experts examined the role
of federalism in Germany for fourteen months. 34S In the hundreds of
pages of commission reports and other submissions, nowhere is there any
339. GG art. 75.
340. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 332, § 16, at 114.
341. Id § 16, at 115. Basic Law Article 70 limits legislative competency to the federal and
state governments. GG art. 70.
342. GG art. 28(2).
343. ZIPPELIUS, supra note 332, § 16, at 122.
344. MARz, supra note 336, at 204 ("In den weit ilberwiegenden Hillen befolgt das
Grundgesetz eine priiYcntiyc Kollisionsstrategie: es venneidet Nonnwiderspruche, urn sie nicht
zu entscheiden zu milssen.").
345. See Bundesrat, Bundesrat FOderalismusrefonn I, http://www.bundesrat.delcln_0511
nn_8350IDEIfoederalismus/foederalismus-node.html?_nnn=true (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
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significant criticism founded on legal indeterminacy in allocation of
legislative authority.346
As already discussed, the states play a key role in the adoption of
federal legislation. The strength of the states became quite apparent in
recent years when the federal government and the lower house, on the
one hand, and most state governments and the upper house, on the other
hand, were controlled by opposing coalitions.
German federalism gives the states not only their own legislative
competence and important participation in federal legislation, it also
gives them the central role in the implementation of federal law. The
Basic Law provides that "the exercise of governmental powers and the
discharge of governmental functions is a matter for the states.,,347
Ordinarily they do so as matters of their own concern,348 subject only to
the supervision of the federal government.349 Sometimes they administer
federal law as agents of the federal governmeneso In a few limited
instances, the federal government itself is responsible for implementation
of federallaw. 3s1 Thus state and federal institutions do not parallel each
other as they do in the United States. The states implement both federal
and state laws themselves.3S2 Federal agencies and federal courts operate
only at the national level. Insofar as decentralization is a goal of
federalism, and if one views decentralization as principally a
management issue,3S3 then the German system may better accomplish
decentralization than does the American system, where federal
authorities implement federal legislation.
The German approach to federalism in assigning implementation to
state authorities has an additional benefit for legal certainty. In Germany,
because there are only state courts in the frrst instance, litigants cannot

346. Kommission von Bundestagc und Bundesrat zur Modernisienmg der
bundesstaatlichen Ordnung. A brief report of its work with links to the submissions is available at
http;lIwww.bundesrat.delcln_051/nn_8350IDEIfoederalismuslbundesstaatskommissionldrsldrsnode.html?_nnn=true (last visited Jan. 23, 2007).
347. GG art. 30 (author's translation).
348. Id art. 83.
349. Id art. 84.
350. Id art. 85.
351. Basic Law Articles 86 to 90 deal with the administration of specific areas by the
federal government (e.g., aviation, federal bank, waterways, and federal highways). Id arts. 8690.

352. See generallyCURRIE, supra note 332, ch. 2 (discussing Gennan federalism).
353. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REv. 903, 910-11 (1994) ("Decentralization is a managerial concept; it
refers to the delegation of centralized authority to subordinate units of either a geographic or a
functional character.... [TJhe main reason to decentralize is to achieve effective managemenC').
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make the mistake of going to the wrong sovereign's court in the first
instance.3S4
Finally, with respect to whether federalism in Germany promotes
the diffusion of political power that serves to protect liberties of the
people-in addition to the role of states--one now must, of course,
acknowledge the role of the European Union. Its importance is now very
substantial as quite possibly a more powerful sovereign than either the
German federal or state governments. A justice of the Federal
Constitutional Court, when posing the provocative question, "Do judges
rule the Germans?;' answered: "Yes, but not German judges, judges of
the European Union.,,3SS
III. COMPARATIVE OBSERVATIONS:

A.

American Legal Indeterminacy and European Legal Certainty

Knowledge of the general principle of legal certainty in European
law should dispel American resignation that wholesale indeterminacy is
an inevitable feature of modern legal systems. Europeans do not accept
it. Americans should not either. While some uncertainty is inherent in
law, legal systems can and do act to reduce that uncertainty to acceptable
levels. Inflexible certainty is not the only alternative to indeterminate
flexibility. Workable certainty consistent with sufficient flexibility
should be the goal.
If the American legal system is to steer between the Scylla of
indeterminate flexibility and the Charybdis of inflexible certainty, it
needs to make legal certainty a guiding idea. While legal certainty is not
the only concern in law, it is an important and legitimate one. Where
legal certainty is a guiding idea, it is given serious consideration in the
creation and development of legal institutions and methods. Those
institutions and methods determine the extent to which legal certainty is
realized in the legal system. Thus, every decision about their form is
potentially an opportunity to enhance or diminish legal certainty.

354. While litigants may not go to the wrong sovereign's court, they might choose the
wrong court in another way. Gennany has separate courts for different fields of law, e.g., civil
courts, labor courts, social welfare courts, etc. Even here, however, the German system provides
for legal certainty. If a litigant goes to the wrong court, that court is directed to decide the
jurisdictional issue and send the case to the right court. The court receiving the case must accept
it and decide it. It has no opportunity to decide the jurisdictional issue itself and return the case to
the sending court. Thus, the ping-pong of different jurisdictions that occasionally happens in the
United States cannot happen in Germany.
355. Udo Steiner, Regieren Richter die Deutschen?, 54 ANwALTSBLATf 673 (2004)
(author's translation).
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Examination of German legal methods reveals many opportunities
in American law to enhance legal certainty. Few of these opportunities
are unfamiliar. Many have been perceived in the past, but were not acted
upon, or were acted upon adversely. Here, I conclude by identifying
some of those opportunities: 3S6
1.

Law Making

Legal rules guide society. They ought to be made with care and in
the interest of the population at large. While their substance is debatable
politically, their form should be noncontroversial: they should guide
those subject to them.
Precise and consistent statutes are a goal of the German legal
system. German statutes are written as norms to be applied. Typically,
these statutes are derInite about the legal results they produce, about who
may invoke them, and about what freedom they grant in their application.
The most important statutes are codified and provide continuity for the
system as a whole.
The seriousness with which the German legal system views rules is
reflected in how German statutes are made and by whom. The authority
to make statutes is limited and carefully controlled. They are made
principally by the ministries of the federal and state governments, under
the supervision of their respective cabinets and ministries of justice, and
subject to the advice and consent of their respective legislatures.
Precision and consistency are also valued in the American legal
system. But statutes remain a stepchild. In the nineteenth-century
debate over codification, the thinking often was that there was a binary
choice between ''unwritten'' case law and ''written'' statute law.
Unwritten case law was seen to provide the flexibility needed to deal
with changing conditions over time, which was viewed as superior to the
supposedly inflexible statutory law. This may still be the prevailing view.
But much has happened in the intervening 120-plus years. Welcomed or
not, statutory law has displaced case law. The promise of unwritten case
law has not been fulfilled. Meanwhile, other legal systems have
demonstrated the use of techniques that bring flexibility to written statute
law.
The authority to make laws is more widely dispersed and less
closely controlled in the American legal system than in· the German
system. The federal and state legislatures make laws, but so, too, do tens
356. References to the Gennan legal system are substantiated in this Article. Those to the
American legal system are substantiated in Maxeiner, supra note 10.
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of thousands of municipalities and even the electorate itself through
ballot initiatives. Usually, the actual drafting is not done by professionals
with subject-matter competency, but by individual legislators who are
frequently acting at the requests of lobbyists. While Americans have
long observed that the American way of legislating is different from that
of most European countries, they continue with their old methods and
tolerate recurrent lobbying scandals.
2.

Law Finding

Rules can guide society only if they are accessible to society at
large. Law fmding is no less important for legal certainty than is the
quality of the laws themselves. For law to be effective, all those affected
by law should fInd the same law. Legal certainty is not promoted if
potential plaintiffs and potential defendants have equally valid but
different conceptions of the applicable law. The guidance function of law
suffers if determining the meaning of law must await judicial
intervention.
German law is well-organized.
Codes provide the basic
background, special statutes provide relative fIrmament outside the area
of codes, and court decisions fIll in final details. Code commentaries
make all of this law readily accessible. The authoritative rule most often
is quickly found.
German judges are charged with finding and interpreting the law.
They treat codes and statutes with respect. They are not allowed to
decide to the contrary and they take care to decide within the spirit of the
statute. They make law, but only as necessary to fIll in gaps in the
statutes. In litigation, their understanding of the law controls the course
of the proceedings.
Finding law in America is difficult. Even in a relatively simple case
it can consume much time and cause much expense. Case law is
acknowledged to be less convenient than code law. For nearly two
centuries Americans have spoken of the deluge, first of cases, then of
statutes. The system has responded with more effective ways of finding
cases and statutes, but has not answered the most pressing problem:
which statute or case is authoritative.
Statutes ought to provide the firm reference points which limit and
guide case law. But American judicial treatment of statutes--encouraged
in part by the lack of system of those statutes-can turn statutes on their
heads. Sensible interpretation and application of statutes may not be
realized until there is greater systematization of them. Moreover, judges
are not presumed to know the law. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil
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Procedure explicitly grants advocates free license to argue for changes in
the law. Thanks to the American cost system, those arguments are
largely risk free.

3.

Law Applying

A law may be a good one, it may be easily found, but if it is not
applied, it is worth little. As we have repeatedly observed, laws are
applied principally by those subject to them. Syllogistic law application
is what the public expects. It is what the public can understand. It is how
the public can apply law to itself. Self-application of laws depends upon
the confidence that laws will be applied generally and neutrally.
The German legal system is based on syllogistic law application. It
takes care to relate the facts of a case to the law to be applied. German
laws are norms and promote self-application. A duty of justification of
decisions applies throughout German law and not just in litigation.
Justified decisions demonstrate their basis in law. They facilitate judicial
review of the substance of the decisions.
German court proceedings are directed toward applying law to
facts. From the outset, German litigation is directed toward eventual
subsumption of facts under rules-toward a decision according to the
law. Plaintiffs must state at the outset on which evidence they intend to
rely. From the get go, judges review whether plaintiffs have stated their
cases against the defendants. Early on, before taking evidence, judges
identify which issues truly are in dispute between the parties and put all
other issues aside. Only then do they take evidence, and then only if
taking evidence is needed. Before deciding a case, they are to alert all
parties of their expected grounds for decision. There should be no
surprises. Once a decision is made, they are to explain why they decided
as they did. Dissatisfied parties may appeal to a higher court to see if the
explanation is based on correct facts and subsumed properly under the
right rules.
The American legal system is only partly based on syllogistic law
application. Other times it is more interested in permitting parties to tell
their stories before judges. Not infrequently, it furnishes a license for
investigation more than a rule to be applied. Law of the former sort
cannot be applied by one party to itself, but requires the participation of
others.
The American legal system only sometimes imposes a duty of
justification, both in litigation and elsewhere. Where it is imposed,
judges in the United States often decide in a manner dissimilar to that of
their German counterparts. But other times, justification is not imposed
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and accepts the power of juries or others to make decisions, even if they
are contrary to law.
American court proceedings were once concerned only with
applying law to facts. In the early nineteenth century, special pleading
was supposed to focus lawsuits on a single legal or factual issue in
dispute. That focus was largely abandoned ~hen notice pleading was
adopted in 1938. The regime then introduced allows the widest latitude
to the parties to investigate and tell their stories independent of the law.
A right to be heard is an essential part of the rule of law and of legal
certainty. But Americans, such as Justice Antonin Scalia, rightly ask
whether that right to be heard should include a right to invent defenses. 357

B.

Rule ConDie! and Rule Coordination in Federalism

Federalism has become. a wildly popular model since its adoption
by the United States in 1789. It is an effective means of governing
geographically large and culturally disparate entities. But federalism
creates issues for legal certainty. The precise boundaries of competencies
between federal and state authorities are political questions inherent in
every federal system. Through using multiple governments, federalism
threatens legal certainty by potentially exposing subjects of law to
conflicting commands. Federalism that honors legal certainty does not
expose subjects to such conflicting commands.
The contemporary German legal system is twice a federal system:
first the Federal Republic consists of sixteen federal states; and second,
the Federal Republic itself is one of twenty-seven Member States of the
European Union. While federal-state and German-EU competency
questions are hotly debated, they are not productive of great legal
indeterminacy.
German legal methods provide for political resolution of issues of
federal-state competency before law applies to subjects. The Basic Law
makes detailed provision for those divisions. Where it is indefinite, it
anticipates judicial review that is efficient and supportive of legal
certainty. Judicial review in Germany is abstract: that means that
constitutional issues, including decisions of legislative competency, are
resolved before laws take effect. Judicial review is concentrated: only
the Federal Constitutional Court may take a law out of force. Room for
delay in decisions and the possibility for disparate interpretations are
commensurately reduced.
357. SccTranscript of Oral Argwnent at 17, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct.
2557 (2006) (No. 05-352).
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Practical rule consistency from state-to-state among the many states
of the Federal Republic and of the European Union is· promoted in
different ways. In some instances, at both levels, a single nation-wide or
union-wide law applies. In other instances, at both levels, states enact
their own laws but subject to framework laws or EU directives.
The German legal system also enhances legal certainty by providing
that most law, state or federal, is applied by state authorities. The EU
legal system follows the same approach and leaves law application
largely to national and subnational authorities.
American federalism is not so supportive of legal certainty. The
division of competencies between state and federal government are often
decided at the expense of litigants in the course of their lawsuits. The
United States Constitution provides less direction than the German Basic
Law as to how competencies are to be shared and judicial review of these
questions is less supportive of rule certainty. American-style judicial
review is interpreted to exclude abstract review (as not a case or
controversy). Review is unconcentrated, rather than concentrated. The
American system perplexes its subjects by presenting them with dual sets
of courts and administration. 3S8
Each of these opportunities should be the subject of serious
comparative study. Such a comparative study should note how the
American method affects legal certainty and what interests besides legal
certainty the method accommodates. It should then examine the foreign
approach in detail to determine both how it enhances or detracts from
legal certainty, as well as how it treats those other interests of concern in
the United States.
The current excessive indeterminacy of American law should be of
no surprise because we pay so little attention to how we build and operate
our legal system. The rules of American law are reminiscent of
grandmother's old homestead where everyone in the family-and nary a
carpenter nor architect among them-added a wing to suit the latest
occupant's need. No wonder no doors close properly, no floors are level
with another, the shingles are failing, the house is collapsing, termites
infest the structure, and water fills the basement. No one properly looks
after it, for everyone thinks that it is someone else's chore. In a modern
world, should we not build our legal system with the same care we build
and operate our best buildings, not our worst? Should we not build it to
function not just for today, but for tomorrow and the day after? Should
358. The United States Supreme Court not long ago took note of the European approach.
SeePrintz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 976-77 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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we not engage professionals to design and build it? What is surprising is
that while living in our ramshackle house, we have paid so little attention
to how our neighbors live. 359

359. See Ernst C. Stiefel & James R. Maxeiner, Why Are Us. Lawyers Not Learning fivm
Comparative Law?, in THE INfERNATIONAL PR.ACI1CE OF LAW 213 (Nedim Peter Vogt et al. eds.,
1997).

